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This  paper  rigorously  investigates  the  determinants  of  bank  com-
petition  for  146  countries  over  the  sample  period  1999–2011.  The
results  employing  both  the  Lerner  index  and  the  Boone  indica-
tor,  reveal  the distinctive  characteristics  of  the  competition  drivers
across  different  income  groups  of countries.  Amongst  other  things,
a  concentrated  banking  system  jeopardises  competitiveness  in
developing  economies,  however,  such  a causal  nexus  is  absent  for
advanced  and  emerging  economies.  Contestability  and  institutional
development  seem  to  boost  competition  in  less-developed  banking
systems,  whereas  inter-industry  competition  and  ﬁnancial  freedom
are  beneﬁcial  to advanced  banking  systems.  These  ﬁndings  survive
robustness  tests.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open
access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
The essential role of bank credit as an input in the production of goods and services places banks
in a unique and inﬂuential position, such that any inefﬁciency in credit allocation, or other market
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distortions in banking, are almost certain to be felt throughout the economy (Shaffer, 2004). Hence,
the issue of bank competition is of vital importance, and the study of market competition can help
understand the social welfare implications of changes in the banking sector. As in other industries,
the degree of competition in the ﬁnancial sector matters for the efﬁciency of production of ﬁnancial
services, the quality of ﬁnancial products and the degree of innovation in the sector (Claessens, 2009).
Therefore, the banking sector can impose severe costs on an economy, if there is anticompetitive
behaviour, leading to inefﬁciency or market failure among banks. This vindicates the importance
of more research into this issue, where the degree of banking competition and its association with
banking structure, regulations, institutions and other key characteristics of a country is essential for
welfare-related public policy in the banking industry. Fernández de Guevara and Maudos (2007) point
out that, from the regulator’s point of view, knowledge and understanding of the degree of competition
may be limited, but ﬁnding the main sources of market power complements this limitation in order to
carry out the reforms necessary to achieve a reduction of the social costs associated with the existence
of monopoly power. Numerous studies have focused on analysing the evolution of competition in
banking markets, however, studies that have attempted to investigate factors explaining intensity of
competition are rather limited. See e.g. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004), Claessens and Laeven (2004) and
Fernández de Guevara and Maudos (2007) who conducted research for advanced economies. In terms
of emerging and developing economies, there is very little empirical work found, except for those of
Jeon et al. (2011) and Delis (2012).2
It is argued that banking sectors in emerging and developing markets are characterised by higher
market-power, relatively weak legal systems, and high levels of networking and corruption in their
respective ﬁnancial systems, which might constrain the strength of competitive forces compared with
those in developed banking systems. Following ﬁnancial market deregulation in the late 1980s in many
emerging countries, their banking markets have been subjected to several structural changes: The
prominent features include innovation in ﬁnancial products and services, removing barriers to entry,
hosting foreign banks, developments in information technology, liberalisation of the ﬁnancial sector
and the internationalisation of banking activities. However, the market-power of ﬁnancial intermedi-
ation in emerging and developing economies remained higher than that in most advanced economies.
Abiad et al. (2010) show countries in all income groups and regions, which have signiﬁcantly reformed
their ﬁnancial sectors over the period 1973–2005. Out of 136 large-reform events, 39 were for emerg-
ing, 25 for advanced, and the rest for developing economies. The main objective of ﬁnancial reform
policies was to promote a diversiﬁed, efﬁcient and competitive ﬁnancial system which is essential for
an efﬁcient allocation of capital. Delis (2012) has attempted to investigate whether such reforms have
been effective in promoting competition among banks, by analysing the impact of ﬁnancial reform
and the quality of institutions on the degree of bank market-power for 84 banking systems around
the world. Estimating the bank-level Bonne indicator for the market-power of banks, Delis (2012)
ﬁnds that bureaucratic quality, the rule of law and transparency, negatively affect market-power but
ﬁnancial liberalisation policies improve competition among banks, only if the country meets certain
criteria of institutional endowment. Hence, ﬁnancial reform may  not have translated into the improve-
ment of banking competition in countries with weaker institutions and a lower level of institutional
development. Such concerns may  be smaller in advanced countries, which have developed ﬁnancial,
legal and regulatory systems, as well as strong protections for private property and economic freedom.
These issues seem to necessitate the study by distinguishing emerging and developing from advanced
economies in order to trace the differences in ﬁndings in the theoretical arguments available in the
literature.
In this paper, we rigorously investigate the driving forces of competition-behaviour in the bank-
ing sector by distinguishing between developed, emerging and developing economies. Due to data
availability, it is impossible to cover all countries, however, we  have a very large coverage of 146
countries over the recent sample period of 1999–2011, which encompasses the period of the ﬁnancial
2 Jeon et al. (2011) investigated emerging Asian and Latin American markets, however, their focus was on the effect of
foreign banks, omitting such variables as those relating to institutions, inter-industry and contestability. Delis (2012) studied
bank competition for 84 countries with a view to analysing the impact of ﬁnancial reform.
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crisis triggered by the US subprime-market. We  relate the evolution of competition to bank structures,
contestability, inter-industry, institutional and other potential explanatory variables (Claessens and
Laeven, 2004; Jeon et al., 2011 and Delis, 2012), and systematically compare across these three types
of economies to avoid proposing a general pattern for all countries.
As one of the driving forces in the evolution of competition, ﬁrstly, we consider concentration. The-
ory provides predictions about the link between market-structure and bank-competition. According
to the traditional structure–conduct–performance hypothesis, a more concentrated market implies
a lower degree of competition due to the undesirable exercise of market power by banks. It can be
also argued that regulatory impediments to competition also create a desirable environment for a few
powerful banks to hinder competition. According to this view, a concentrated market is a useful signal
of an uncompetitive market. Indeed, antitrust authorities use measures of market-concentration to
make an initial assessment of competition, and analyse whether concentration will create or enhance
the exercise of market-power. The issues of competition and concentration in the banking industry are
heavily debated by policy makers, however, the empirical literature on the relationship is compara-
tively scarce. Also, existing studies have shown a mixed picture. Whilst earlier studies ﬁnd an inverse
relationship between concentration and the degree of competition, new empirical studies show a
lesser association of concentration and competition,3 and hence they cannot be used interchangeably.
For example, if the market is contestable, i.e. no barriers to entry and exit, even very concentrated
markets can remain competitive. The lack of importance of market structure implies that competition
policy in the ﬁnancial sector is more complicated than it is expected. Thus, more work needs to be
done to shed further light on this debate.
Secondly, the role of market regulations is considered as a determinant in shaping competition.
According to the theory of industrial organisation, the competitiveness of an industry cannot be mea-
sured by market-structure alone, whereas the theory of entry can be a more relevant issue for analysing
factors that explain the behaviour of market participants. Also, the New Industrial Organization theory
proposes a structural, contestability approach that can effectively test the degree of competition (see
Baumol, 1982). Institutional quality, as well as the degree of inter-industry competition (such as stock
market and insurance companies), may  also play an important role in determining banking-system
competitiveness (Claessens and Laeven, 2004). For instance, it is found that the institutional environ-
ments in some countries hampers competition. Hence, we also consider these factors in our empirical
analyses.
Estimation of competition, i.e. the inverse of market-power, is heavily inﬂuenced by the New Empir-
ical Industrial Organization (NEIO) literature. This literature has been developed primarily from the
models of, for instance, Bresnahan (1982) and Panzar and Rosse (1987). The most popular tool, widely
used for the estimation of bank market-power, is the Lerner (1934) index, owing to its simplicity, its
straightforward interpretation and the fact that it does not pose stringent data requirements. The H-
statistic of Panzar and Rosse (1987) is also used routinely in the literature on banking to assess degrees
of competition. The disadvantage of this method is that it maps the various degrees of market-power
only weakly and, thus, cannot be viewed as a continuous variable. It is argued that the only hypothesis
that can be tested using the H-statistic is whether a bank operates in long run equilibrium.
In our empirical application, we employ the Lerner index and also the Boone indicator. The Lerner
index is the price-cost margin and is the method often used in several studies of banking competition
(e.g. Fernández de Guevara et al., 2005 and Anginer et al., 2014). The Boone indicator is the elasticity
of proﬁts to marginal cost (Boone et al., 2005 and Boone, 2008). It captures the reallocation of market-
share to efﬁcient from inefﬁcient banks. See Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) and Delis (2012) for the
empirical application. The published data at country-level by the World Bank (Global Financial Devel-
opment Database 2012) are utilised for the Lerner index and the Boone indicator. We  also use two
other databases of bank competition as robustness tests. The ﬁrst one is the adjusted Lerner index and
the Boone indicator at country-level, reported in Clerides et al. (2013), and the second one is based on
our own estimation of the Lerner index at bank-level using the BankScope database.
3 The studies by Claessens and Laeven (2004), Fernández de Guevara et al. (2005) Fernández de Guevara and Maudos (2007)
and Carbo et al. (2009) all show the inadequacy of using concentration measures as a proxy for the competition environment
in  the banking sector.
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The empirical results reveal distinctive characteristics of competition-drivers for different income
levels of an economy. A concentrated banking system jeopardises the competitiveness in develop-
ing economies, in line with the traditional view of competition policy, whereas such a causal nexus
is absent for advanced and emerging economies. Contestability and institutional development are
found to be the key driving forces of competition in non-advanced banking systems. Rivalry from
other segments of ﬁnancial-services industries and ﬁnancial freedom are contributory to boosting
the competitiveness amongst advanced banks. The ownership structure seems to matter for bank
competition in emerging and developing countries. Foreign bank-ownership favours competition for
the former, whereas state bank-ownership is a hindrance to competition in the latter. These ﬁndings
are robust to model speciﬁcation and alternative measures of competition and remain unchanged by
controlling bank-speciﬁc traits.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews literature. Section 3 provides
the empirical models. Section 4 presents an analysis of data. Section 5 contains the estimation results
together with robustness tests. Conclusions are offered in Section 6.
2. Literature review
With respect to competition measures, several indicators are found in literature, which can be
classiﬁed into two major categories: those that use the traditional structural measures of com-
petition and those that fall within the so-called ‘new empirical industrial organization’ models
(i.e. the non-structural approach). The traditional measures use concentration indices under the
structure–conduct–performance or the efﬁcient-structure hypothesis. The non-structural indicators
include the estimation of the mark-up test of Bresnahan (1982), the Panzar and Rosse test (Nathan
and Neave, 1989; Molyneux et al., 1994 and Bikker and Haaf, 2002) or instruments derived from
Monti–Klein-type banking competition models, such as the estimation of Lerner index (Fernández de
Guevara et al., 2005 and Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2007).
One of the non-structural indicators used to assess competitive behaviour in ﬁnancial services are
based on the model advocated by Panzar and Rosse (1987). This methodology, extensively applied
in banking studies, is based on reduced-form revenue functions using bank-level data. It investigates
market-power, the so-called, H-statistic, measured by the extent to which changes in factor prices are
reﬂected in revenues. Panzar and Rosse show that this statistic can reﬂect the structure and conduct
of the market to which the ﬁrm belongs.4 The critical feature of the H-statistic is that it measures a
degree of bank-competition over a speciﬁc period of time, giving one score over that time so that it
does not capture the evolution of bank-competition. Although Bikker and Haaf (2002) and Jeon et al.
(2011) estimate the time-varying version of Panzar and Rosse H-statistics in order to account for the
market dynamic of a banking system, it does not come without limitations. For instance, using the
time-varying H-statistics implies that either bank competition is increasing or decreasing over-time,
and this is not in accordance with the real world, since, if competition increases in one year, it may
decease or be constant in the next year.5
An alternative approach to the Panzer and Rosse methodology is the Lerner model developed
by Lerner (1934), which has recently attracted many European scholars. This is developed from the
(static) theory of ﬁrm models under equilibrium conditions and typically use some form of price mark-
up against a competitive benchmark: the Lerner index is the mark-up of price (average revenue) over
marginal cost. The higher the mark-up, the greater is the realised market power. In empirical work, a
4 For a body of recent literature using H-statistic to gauge the degree of bank competition, see, e.g. Mamatzakis et al. (2005),
Levy Yeyati and Micco (2007) and Delis (2010) for emerging economies, and Matthews et al. (2007) an Goddard and Wilson
(2009) for advanced economies (for a comprehensive study see also Bikker et al., 2012).
5 Bikker et al. (2012) also show that a Panzar–Rosse price function or scaled-revenue equations which have been widely
applied in literature cannot be used to infer the degree of competition. They argue that only an unscaled revenue equation
version of H-statistics may  yield a valid measure of competition. Even if the competitive climate is assessed on the basis
of  an unscaled revenue equation, the Panzar–Rosse H-statistic generally requires additional information about costs, market
equilibrium and market-demand elasticity to allow meaningful interpretation.
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number of recent studies have used the Lerner index to determine the trend in competitive behaviour
over time, speciﬁcally, in European countries.
Boone (2000, 2004) and Boone et al. (2005) introduced, the so-called Boone indicator, which meas-
ures the impact of efﬁciency on performance in terms of proﬁts or market-share. The underlying
concept behind the Boone indicator is that competition enhances the performance of efﬁcient banks
and impairs the performance of inefﬁcient banks, which is reﬂected in their respective proﬁts or
market-share. This approach is closely associated with the well-known efﬁciency hypothesis, which
also explains banks’ performances by differences in efﬁciency (Goldberg and Rai, 1996 and Smirlock,
1985). The hypothesis of Boone’s model takes two steps. Firstly, efﬁcient banks, i.e. banks with lower
marginal costs, gain higher market-share or proﬁts. Secondly, this is translated into the fact that, if this
effect is stronger, the higher the degree of competition in that particular market is. See, for instance,
Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007), who is the ﬁrst to apply the Boone indicator to the banking market for
the Euro area.
Studies attempting to assess the impact of banking market-structure, regulations and institutional
factors on competition are limited. Bikker and Haaf (2002), for instance, regress the H-statistic on a
variety of concentration indices for a sample of 23 industrialised countries, and the results show the
presence of a negative relationship between the degree of concentration and the level of competi-
tion. Contrary to these results, Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), in their analysis of the Italian banking
sector, uncover a positive association using the Lerner index and the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index.
For a sample of 50 countries, Claessens and Laeven (2004) also ﬁnd the same result by employing the
H-statistic. Fernández de Guevara et al. (2005) in a study on European banking sectors emphasise that
concentration is inadequate as an indicator of competition. Likewise, Staikouras and Koutsomanoli-
Fillipaki (2006) report that European banking systems have experienced a substantial increase in
competition (measured by the H-statistic) during the period 1998–2002 with higher levels of con-
centration. Furthermore, Park (2009) examined whether consolidation amongst Korean commercial
banks lessened competition for the period 1992–2004, and found that contrary to a growing concern
over market-power of Korean banks, an increased concentration has not impaired competition.
According to the traditional viewpoint, an increase in concentration fosters collusion and impairs
competition. However, it is difﬁcult to judge whether concentration decreases competition among
banks, based on these empirical ﬁndings, where the case for using concentration as a proxy for com-
petition is seriously disputed. This is critical for the inference of policy implications since concentration
does not necessarily imply a lack of competition.
Claessens and Laeven (2004) analyse the effect of banking regulations and institutional settings’
indicators on competitiveness employing the constant H-statistics of Panzar and Rosse (1987). Using
bank-level data for 50 countries, they ﬁnd that the contestability market-theory showed a stronger
effect on competition than did concentration, in particular, fewer entry and activity restrictions as well
as greater foreign-bank entry to the market positively affected the level of competition. The ﬁnding
of Bikker and Spierdijk (2009) based on the Panzar–Rosse approach is supportive to that of Claessens
and Laeven (2004) for 101 countries: traditional market-structure variables, such as concentration
and the number of banks are found to have no impact at all. In Bikker and Spierdijk (2009), explaining
the measured competition by a large set of potential determinants reveal that competition in many
countries would be higher with more anti-trust regulation, fewer obstacles to foreign investment and
fewer cross-sector restrictions. Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) also ﬁnd that the deregulation process
signiﬁcantly contributed to improving bank-competition during the 1990s in Italy, whereas Turk-Ariss
(2009) argues that contestability determines effective competition by allowing foreign-bank entry and
reducing activity restrictions on banks in the Middle Eastern and North African banking sectors. The
study by Thorsten Beck and Jonghe (2013) indicates that the positive association between competition
and banks’ fragility increases with the presence of strict activity restrictions. Delis (2012) examines
the degree of market-power as measured by the Boone indicator for 84 banking systems worldwide,
and ﬁnds that competition improves in developed countries with advanced institutions, however, it is
unlikely to improve at the same rate in countries with weaker institutions. The empirical evidence by
Anginer et al. (2014) also reveals that a lack of competition can be mitigated by a strong institutional
environment.
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The structure of the banking sector provides information on potential threats to compe-
tition. However, a growing body of empirical research over the past decade or two seems
to suggest that structure, itself, does not seem to impair competition. It is the conduct of
ﬁnancial institutions that may  determine competitive behaviour among banks. To assess the
real situation of banking systems in terms of competition, we investigate the evolution of
competition by relating it to market structure, contestability, inter-industry competition and
institutional and macro-economic conditions. We  include all developed, emerging and devel-
oping countries, as long as data availability permits, and systematically compare these three
types of economies to derive the speciﬁc sources of competition. The more sophisticated meas-
ures of the Lerner index and the Boone indicator are utilised for competition rather than the
Panzer–Rosse method. Determining the drivers of competition and observing different features
across different income groups are crucial in further developing competitive policies and regula-
tions.
3. Model speciﬁcation
3.1. Measuring competition
The Lerner index is a measure of market-power in the banking market. It is deﬁned as the dif-
ference between output prices and marginal costs (relative to prices). Prices are calculated as total
bank revenue over assets, whereas marginal costs are obtained from an estimated translog cost func-
tion with respect to output. The index ranges from the highest, 1, to the lowest, 0, with a higher
number implying greater market-power or less competition. The dataset of the Lerner index of
the World Bank follows the methodology described in Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2010)
using data collected from BankScope. The Boone indicator is a measure of the degree of compe-
tition, computed as the elasticity of proﬁts to marginal costs. To obtain the elasticity, the log of
proﬁts (measured by return on assets) is regressed on the log of marginal costs. The estimated
coefﬁcient (derived from the ﬁrst derivative of a translog cost function) is the elasticity. The ratio-
nale behind the indicator is that higher proﬁts are achieved by more efﬁcient banks. Hence, the
more negative the Boone indicator, the higher the degree of competition is, since the effect of
reallocation is stronger. The dataset of the Boone indicator in the World Bank follow the method-
ology used by Schaeck and Cihak (2010) with some modiﬁcation by using marginal costs instead
of average costs. Regional estimates of the Boone indicator pool the bank data by regions (for
more information, see Hay and Liu, 1997, Boone, 2001 and Boone et al., 2005), based on under-
lying data in BankScope. For our main empirical application, the dataset of the World Bank is
used.
For the robustness test, we employ the dataset of the adjusted Lerner index and the Boone
indicator published in Clerides et al. (2013). The bank selection criteria for estimating the Lerner
and Boone indicators are different from the dataset of the World Bank. There are also a num-
ber of differences in estimation. Firstly, Clerides et al. use the modiﬁcation of the conventional
Lerner index, i.e. adjusted Lerner index that accounts for the possibility of foregone rents (Koetter
et al., 2012). Koetter et al. (2012) pointed out that the conventional Lerner index assumes both
proﬁt- and cost-efﬁciency, hence the estimated price-cost margins do not accurately measure the
true picture of market-power. See Koetter et al. (2012) who developed the efﬁciency-adjusted
Lerner index. Secondly, marginal costs are estimated based on a smooth coefﬁcient model, or
a semi-parametric method, of Delis (2012), which allows increasing the ﬂexibility of the func-
tional form imposed on the cost function. Clerides et al. use the local polynomial ﬁtting regression
and the Gaussian kernel function to obtain regression coefﬁcients of the translog costs func-
tion for each bank at each time period. See Delis et al. (2012) for the detailed discussion. Delis
et al. (2012) and Wheelock and Wilson (2012) show that estimation of marginal costs using
semi-parametric and non-parametric methods performs signiﬁcantly better than do parametric tech-
niques.
The two datasets of the World Bank and Clerides et al. (2013) are at country-level. Hence, we
elaborate by estimating the bank-level data of the Lerner index for a further robustness check covering
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134 countries (see Panel C, Table A.1). This allows us to assess the impact of bank regulations and
institutions at bank-level.6 The Lerner index is computed as:
Lernerit =
Pit − MCit
Pit
(1)
where Pit is the price charged by bank i at time t on their assets and MCit is the marginal cost. The
marginal cost is estimated on the basis of the following translog cost function for each country:
ln (Cit) = ˛0 + ˛1 × ln Qit +
1
2
× ˛2 × (ln Qit)2 +
3∑
j=1
ˇj × ln wj,it +
1
2
3∑
j=1
3∑
k=1
ˇjk × ln wj,it
× ln wk,it +
3∑
j=1
j × ln Q × ln wj,it +  ˚ × Year dummies
+  ˝ × Bank specialization dummies + εit (2)
where Cit is the total cost (interest expenses and other operating costs) of bank i at time t. Following
prior studies (e.g. Anginer et al., 2014, among others), we choose one output: total assets (Q), and
three input prices: cost of deposits (w1) computed by dividing ﬁnancial costs (interest paid) by their
corresponding liabilities, cost of labour (w2) calculated by dividing personnel costs by total assets, and
cost of physical capital (w3) calculated as the ratio between expenditures on plant and equipment
(other non-interest expenses) and the book value of physical capital (ﬁxed assets). Since we have
three bank specializations of commercial, co-operative and savings banks, we  use bank dummies to
capture the effect of each type of bank (Anginer et al., 2014). Furthermore, to account for changes in
technology over time, we include Year dummies.
With the symmetry restriction imposed, necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for our translog spec-
iﬁcation are linearly homogeneous in input prices, hence:
3∑
j=1
ˇj = 1
3∑
k=1
ˇjk = 0 (j = 1, 2, 3)
3∑
j=1
j = 1
We  then use the coefﬁcient estimates from Eq. (2) to estimate the marginal cost for bank i in time
t:
MCit =
∂Cit
∂Qit
= Cit
Qit
⎡
⎣˛1 + ˛2 × ln Qit +
3∑
j=1
j × ln wj,it
⎤
⎦ (3)
3.2. Determinants of competition
We  consider the banking market-structure, contestability, inter-industry, institutions and macro-
economic environment for the determinants of competition.
For the structure of the banking system, we specify the following variables: (i) bank concentration,
which is measured by the market share of the ﬁve largest banks in the country, (ii) a number of banks
per hundred thousand inhabitants in a particular country as a proxy for the density of banks, and (iii)
foreign and state bank ownership, i.e. the share of assets of banks which are foreign-controlled and
government-controlled,7 respectively. Note that those banks that are 50% or more government- and
foreign-owned are taken account of as state- and foreign-owned, respectively.
For contestability of the respective markets, we  consider (i) the activity restriction variable, which
indicates the limits imposed on commercial banks to engage in securities markets, insurance and
6 Note that the Boone indicator cannot be estimated at bank-level.
7 Government ownership of banks is likely to inﬂuence the pricing of loans and deposits.
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real estate activities with higher scores indicating more restrictions (Barth et al., 2001), (ii) the limit
on foreign banks, which measures the extent to which foreign banks may  own domestic banks and
enter a country’s banking industry, (iii) the entry requirement and the fraction of entry applications
denied to both domestic and foreign banks, and (iv) the restriction on the formulation of ﬁnancial
conglomerates.8 With institutional variables, we employ (i) an overall indicator of ﬁnancial freedom
that captures the degree to which banks are free to conduct their business, (ii) property rights that
are an indicator of the protection of private property rights, and (iii) the KKZ institution index that
is an aggregate indicator of the quality of institutional development in the country, computed using
information on six issues of voice accountability, political stability, a government’s effectiveness, reg-
ulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. For inter-industry development, we specify
(i) the degree of insurance penetration that is measured by the amount of annual life and non-life
insurance premiums collected, divided by GDP, as a competition indicator from non-bank ﬁnancial
institutions, and (ii) market capitalization and stock-market efﬁciency measured by the stock-market
turnover ratio as a proxy of the degree of capital-market competition. For these institutional vari-
ables, a positive association with competition is expected. Likewise a positive relationship is expected
for inter-industry indicators, where the developed non-bank ﬁnancial institutions or capital markets
generate competitive pressure on the banking system.
For control variables, we specify macroeconomic variables of GDP per capita as a proxy for the
general level of development in a country, bank-credit growth, GDP growth as a proxy for the economic
size and activity, and the inﬂation rate as an indicator for macroeconomic stability.
By specifying the above potential determinants of competition, we have the following model for
estimation (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004 and Claessens and Laeven, 2004):
Competitionct = ˇ0 +  ˝ × Market structurect +  × Market contestabilityct + 
× Inter industryct +  × Institutionct +  × Control variablesct + ϕ
× Dummy  crisist + εct (4)
where subscripts c and t refer to country and year, respectively. Competition is a competitiveness
indicator: the Lerner index or the Boone indicator. Market structure is a vector of market structure
indicators (concentration ratio, number of banks relative to population and bank ownership sta-
tus), Contestability is a vector of regulatory variables (activity restriction, ﬁnancial conglomerates,
limit on foreign banks, entry requirements and fraction of entry denied), Inter-industry is a vector
of inter-industry development indicators (insurance penetration, market capitalisation and stock-
market efﬁciency) and Institution is a vector of institutional variables (ﬁnancial freedom, property
rights, and the KKZ index). Control is a vector of macroeconomic variables (GDP per capita, GDP growth,
credit and inﬂation). Dummy crisis takes 1 for year 2008–2011, and 0 otherwise, in order to control
the recent ﬁnancial crisis. ε is the error term.
4. Data
Three different datasets of competition are used for the main and the robustness estimations.
The ﬁrst dataset of the Lerner index and the Boone indicator used for the main estimation is, collected
from the Global Financial Development Database of the World Bank. The database covers 167 countries,
however, due to limited observations for some countries, we have selected 146 countries for estimation
over the period 1999–2011. The second dataset used for the robustness test is retrieved from Clerides
et al. (2013), who provide the data of the Lerner index, the adjusted Lerner index and the Boone
indicator. Clerides et al. estimated the degree of competition in the banking sectors of 148 countries
worldwide over the period 1997–2010. We  exclude those countries that are not included in our main
estimation for consistency, and hence we have a panel dataset of 128 countries. We  extract the data
for the adjusted Lerner index and the Boone indicator from Tables 6 and 7 in Clerides et al. (2013),
8 See Table A.3 for the deﬁnition.
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respectively.9 The third dataset is based on bank-level data, which we  have estimated by specifying
the Lerner model as in Eqs. (1)–(3) in Section 3 above. We  initially selected 152 countries that have
more than 5 banks in BankScope, however, by eliminating those countries that are not included in the
main dataset, we have 134 countries covering 7517 banks over the period of 1999–2011.10
Table A.1 shows the sample selection and the number of countries for these datasets, and Table A.2
reproduces the Lerner index and the Boone indicator, published by the World Bank and Clerides et al.
(2013). In Table A.2, the income group for each country is indicated by the World Bank classiﬁcation.
Fig. 1a and b plot the Lerner index and the Boone indicators of the World Bank and Clerides et al.
(2013), respectively.11 Fig. 1a shows a relatively moderate and smooth movement, whereas signiﬁcant
volatility is apparent in Fig. 1b. Some common trends are shown: The Boone indicator seems to play
a leading role in terms of evolution, as the Lerner index, in general, follows with approximately a
one year time lag. An upward trend is observed up until around 2002–2004, indicating a gradual
deterioration in competition, followed by a downward trend. There is a clear indication of the adverse
effect of the ﬁnancial crisis around 2008, where banks started regaining their market-power.
Fig. 2 presents the evolution of the averaged Lerner index of 146 countries in different income-
group countries. It clearly shows a higher level of competition for advanced economies in comparison
to less-developed countries. It is also observed that market-power in emerging banking systems is
steadily increasing over the period, whereas the evolution of competition in developing countries
is more or less constant over the sample period. It seems that the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis is
strongly felt in the advanced countries. This heterogeneous evolution of competition surely justiﬁes
our approach in classifying the countries into three different income groups.
The model is speciﬁed with the contemporaneous regressors except for regulatory variables. With
respect to contestability variables, data are based on surveys by Barth et al. (2013). Surveys were
conducted in 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011. Since the effect of the country-level regulations is felt
slowly over time and also following Anginer et al. (2014), we specify the previously available survey
data until a new survey becomes available. Speciﬁcally, the survey data of 1999 are used for 1999–2002,
the survey data of 2003 for 2003–2006, the survey data of 2007 for 2007–2010, the survey data of 2011
for 2011.
The detail of the deﬁnition and sources of all variables are provided in Table A.3 and the average of
market-structure, regulation and institutions across countries are shown in Table A.4. The summary
statistics are found in Table 1.
5. Empirical results
We  estimate Eq. (4) by regressing the measures of competition on the potential determinants,
applying the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM)  of Arellano and Bond (1991) to all estimations.
There are likely to be correlations amongst some of the regressors speciﬁed in the model. For instance,
as argued in González (2009), bank concentration may  be associated with stricter bank-entry restric-
tions, more generous insurance, and a stronger legal environment. The model may  also suffer from
a potential endogeneity problem, among others, the effect on bank concentration may  derive from
bank competition. The GMM  technique mitigates these problems. We use the lagged once- and twice-
dependent and independent variables as instrument variables, which are not rejected by the Sargan
test.
9 Note that in preliminary estimation, we ﬁnd similar results between the conventional Lerner index and the adjusted Lerner
index  in Clerides et al. (2013) with the correlation coefﬁcient of 86%.
10 Several criteria are used to ﬁlter bank-data. Banks must be active; hence banks that went into bankruptcy are removed.
These data are only from commercial, savings and cooperative banks: banks that carry out traditional banking activity. Certain
outlier rules are also applied: the 1st and 99th percentiles of the distributions of main variables are eliminated. This helps
alleviate the problems arising from extreme outliers that affect estimation. In order to ensure that each bank is included only
once in the dataset, we use unconsolidated statements when available and consolidated statements when the unconsolidated
ones were not available. Merged banks are considered as separate entities before the merger and as one entity afterwards. Note
also  that we exclude subsidiaries of parent banks to avoid double counting.
11 Note that the correlation coefﬁcient between the Lerner index in World Bank and the adjusted Lerner index in Clerides et al.
(2013) is 54% that is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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Bank Competition in 146 Countries over 1999-2011. Source: World Bank-GFI
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Fig. 1. (a) Evolution of bank competition (World Bank data). This ﬁgure shows the evolution of the averaged Lerner index and
Boone  indicator across 146 countries. (b) Evolution of bank competition (Clerides et al. data). This ﬁgure shows the evolution
of  the averaged Lerner index and Boone indicator across 128 countries.
5.1. Preliminary results based on World Bank dataset
Table 2 reports the preliminary regression results including all countries.12 We  run various regres-
sions by isolating one category of explanatory variables from others.13 This is important, since there
is some concern of the potential multicollinearity amongst some independent variables, and also
there are some missing variables in this unbalanced panel data set.14 Panel A speciﬁes the banking
12 In all estimated regressions, we included the constant term and dummy  variables, though not reported.
13 However, note that we  retain macroeconomic control variables in all regressions in order to control for differences in
economic development and stability across countries.
14 Note that there is a different number of observations from one model to another model. This is due to the fact that the
sources of contestability, institutions and market-structure variables are from different databases and each database does not
necessarily hold information for all countries.
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Fig. 2. Evolution of bank competition in different income-group countries (World Bank data). This ﬁgure shows the evolution
of  the averaged Lerner index across 146 countries in different income groups.
structure, and Panel B deals with contestability and structure-contestability. Panel C and Panel D cover
inter-industry and institutional indicators, respectively.
The result in Panel A of Table 2 evidently indicates that variables describing the banking-
system structure can help explain its measured competitiveness, in particular, bank-concentration
Table 1
Summary statistics. Deﬁnitions of variables are in Table A.3.
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Med. Max.
Bank competition
Lerner index 1581 0.251 0.135 −1.609 0.244 0.650
Boone  indicator 1825 −0.045 0.297 −2.162 −0.055 5.968
Market structure
Concentration % 1471 80.667 15.967 28.050 83.463 100.000
Log  (No. of banks to population) 1742 −13.072 1.443 −16.705 −13.193 −7.557
Foreign bank ownership % 1282 36.930 31.254 0.000 25.800 100.000
State  bank ownership % 1303 16.846 21.668 0.000 6.800 95.780
Market contestability
Activity restriction 1492 7.492 2.042 3.000 8.000 12.000
Financial conglomeratem 1425 6.796 1.758 3.000 7.000 12.000
Limit  on foreign banks 1237 3.755 0.629 0.000 4.000 4.000
Entry  requirement 1702 7.584 0.985 0.000 8.000 8.000
Fraction denied % 724 0.182 0.267 0.000 0.004 1.000
Inter-industry
Insurance penetration % 1662 2.880 2.869 0.005 1.747 18.188
Stock  market capitalization % 1251 54.807 63.733 0.101 34.594 606.001
Stock  market efﬁciency 1231 50.730 78.563 0.000 25.785 1612.942
Institution
Financial freedom 1767 54.041 18.342 10.000 50.000 90.000
Property right 1767 50.733 22.692 0.000 50.000 95.000
KKZ  index 1606 0.077 0.870 −1.747 −0.127 1.986
Control variables
Log (GDP per capita) 1705 10.668 2.245 5.599 10.376 16.894
Bank  credit growth 1550 0.039 1.056 −17.388 0.023 31.662
GDP  growth % 1703 4.333 4.296 −17.955 4.260 34.500
Inﬂation % 1652 7.052 15.926 −8.525 4.100 324.997
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Table 2
Competition model based on World Bank data: baseline results. Deﬁnitions of all variables are listed in Table A.3. We  estimate
all  regressions using the two-step GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991). Robust T-values are in parentheses. *, **, ***
denote signiﬁcance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Sargan test: the test for over-identifying restrictions in the GMM
dynamic model estimation. AR(1) and AR(2): the autocorrelation tests in residuals of order 1 and 2, respectively. Sample size
varies  across regression speciﬁcations since not all variables are available for all countries and/or for the full sample period
(1999–2011).
Panel A: Market structure and competition: regression results of the model.
Competitionct = ˇ0 +  ˝ × Market structurect +  × Control variablesct + ϕ × Dummy crisist + εct
Model 1: Lerner index Model 2: Boone indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.315*** 0.354*** 0.130*** 0.049***
(8.95) (10.10) (70.02) (41.67)
Market structure
Concentration 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.002** 0.001**
(2.61) (2.89) (1.96) (2.42)
No. of banks to
population
−0.015 −0.007 −0.067* −0.013
(−1.15) (−1.08) (−1.70) (−0.47)
Foreign bank
ownership
−0.005*** −0.005*** −0.007*** −0.006***
(−3.66) (−3.30) (−12.31) (−10.13)
State bank ownership 0.003 0.001 0.012*** 0.002**
(1.11) (0.69) (6.15) (2.00)
Control variables
Log (GDP per capita) 0.023* 0.037***
(1.75) (4.31)
Bank credit growth −0.003*** −0.000***
(−3.40) (−2.69)
GDP growth −0.001 −0.001
(−0.13) (−0.94)
Inﬂation −0.002*** 0.002***
(−2.98) (8.22)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.12 0.14 0.31 0.31
AR(1)-(p-value) 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00
AR(2)-(p-value) 0.41 0.33 0.66 0.90
Number of country 146 146 146 146
Number of obs. 839 779 904 836
Panel B: Market contestability and competition: regression results of the model.
Competitionct = ˇ0 +  × Market contestabilityct +  × Control variablesct + ϕ × Dummy  crisist + εct
Model 1: Lerner index Model 2: Boone indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.089*** 0.073*** 0.081*** 0.091***
(12.23) (13.69) (10.40) (9.98)
Market contestability
Activity restriction 0.077*** 0.061*** 0.032*** 0.031***
(4.79) (3.95) (12.71) (13.45)
Financial
conglomeratem
0.059*** 0.052*** 0.064* 0.055*
(3.55) (3.06) (1.83) (1.71)
Limit  on foreign banks 0.031 0.029 0.006 0.070***
(1.63) (1.03) (0.31) (3.17)
Entry  requirement 0.067*** 0.058** 0.031*** 0.012***
(3.49) (1.98) (3.33) (3.81)
Fraction denied 0.773* 0.609* 0.305 0.345
(1.76) (1.71) (1.21) (1.06)
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Table 2 (Continued)
Panel B: Market contestability and competition: regression results of the model.
Competitionct = ˇ0 +  × Market contestabilityct +  × Control variablesct + ϕ × Dummy  crisist + εct
Model 1: Lerner index Model 2: Boone indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control variables
Log (GDP per capita) −0.019*** 0.177***
(−2.62) (10.47)
Bank credit growth −0.004*** −0.001
(−6.18) (−0.71)
GDP growth 0.003*** −0.002***
(4.35) (−10.98)
Inﬂation −0.003*** −0.002***
(−4.49) (−5.25)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.61 0.82 0.43 0.92
AR(1)-(p-value) 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00
AR(2)-(p-value) 0.13 0.09 0.32 0.32
Number of country 146 146 146 146
Number of obs. 371 356 413 373
Panel  C: Inter-industry and competition: regression results of the model.
Competitionct = ˇ0 +  × Inter industryct +  × Control variablesct + ϕ × Dummy  crisist + εct
Model 1: Lerner index Model 2: Boone indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.201*** 0.226*** 0.194*** 0.190***
(6.89) (8.02) (7.80) (7.76)
Inter-industry
Insurance penetration −0.009*** −0.008*** −0.019*** −0.018***
(−4.72) (−3.03) (−3.68) (−4.52)
Stock market
capitalization
−0.001 −0.001 −0.001* −0.001*
(−1.50) (−1.23) (−1.76) (−1.74)
Stock market efﬁciency −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(−0.76) (−1.38) (−0.05) (−0.31)
Control variables
Log (GDP per capita) 0.008 −0.023***
(0.66) (−4.47)
Bank credit growth −0.004** 0.002
(−2.38) (0.37)
GDP  growth 0.001 0.001
(1.37) (0.86)
Inﬂation −0.002*** −0.002***
(−4.63) (−5.26)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.21 0.25 0.15 0.12
AR(1)-(p-value) 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02
AR(2)-(p-value) 0.94 0.98 0.33 0.35
Number of country 146 146 146 146
Number of obs. 1006 942 1041 976
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Table 2 (Continued)
Panel D: Institution and competition: regression results of the model.
Competitionct = ˇ0 +  × Institutionct +  × Control variablesct + ϕ × Dummy  crisist + εct
Model 1: Lerner index Model 2: Boone indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.324*** 0.311*** 0.283*** 0.282***
(9.19) (9.21) (8.84) (8.19)
Institution
Financial freedom 0.001 0.001 −0.003 −0.004
(0.36) (0.33) (−0.83) (−0.63)
Property right −0.001 −0.001 −0.006*** −0.004***
(−0.51) (−0.78) (−9.31) (−7.12)
KKZ index −0.011*** −0.018*** −0.416*** −0.489***
(3.78) (−4.19) (−20.45) (−24.58)
Control variables
Log (GDP per capita) −0.009 −0.110***
(−0.77) (−6.12)
Bank credit growth −0.002** −0.002***
(−2.09) (−4.51)
GDP growth 0.001*** 0.001
(2.79) (1.62)
Inﬂation −0.002*** −0.001***
(−3.36) (−3.59)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.26 0.07 0.09 0.12
AR(1)-(p-value) 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00
AR(2)-(p-value) 0.74 0.83 0.24 0.27
Number of country 146 146 146 146
Number of obs. 1295 1180 1444 1269
is positively correlated with market-power. This is in line with the traditional structure
conduct–performance hypothesis, where intensiﬁed market-power may  be brought about among the
large dominant banks. In terms of foreign bank-ownership, the coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant
with a negative sign in all regressions, indicating that foreign bank-ownership contributes to improv-
ing the level of competition. Countries may  beneﬁt more from hosting foreign banks. On the other
hand, state bank-ownership tends to erode competition as evidenced in the Boone indicator, highlight-
ing the difﬁculty in generating competition for the banks under state-ownership. Of the contestability
variables in Panel B, we ﬁnd that banking competition can be undermined by restrictions on bank activ-
ities and on the establishment of conglomerates. Contestable systems due to high entry-requirements
also face a lesser competition. The result with respect to the inter-industry competition in Panel C
shows that deeper insurance penetration enhances competition among banks, however, the compet-
itiveness does not seem to be much affected by the stock-market capitalisation, nor by stock-market
efﬁciency.
It is argued that institutional quality is usually seen as the means by which competition in
markets is maintained, rather than to improve competition, hence institutional variables have lit-
tle direct effect on bank competition (Delis, 2012). Notwithstanding this, turning to Panel C, the
KKZ index and Property rights (only in the Boone indicator) are found to be exerting a posi-
tive effect on competition. In terms of the control variables, the results are somewhat mixed
across regressions. The consistent results include that with the growth in bank credit, com-
petition among banks intensiﬁes. The coefﬁcients of the inﬂation rate are mostly signiﬁcantly
negative, indicating a positive association between economic instability and intensiﬁed bank com-
petition.
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5.2. Main results based on World Bank dataset
We  estimate Eq. (4) by splitting the countries into different groups of income, i.e. advanced, emerg-
ing and developing countries (see Table A.2 for the classiﬁcation of income groups for each country.)
Panel A and Panel B are the results for the Lerner index and the Boone indicator, respectively. The
model speciﬁcation in the table is based on the general-to-speciﬁc model, where we retain the sta-
tistically signiﬁcant variables, if they are found in regressions in either the Lerner or Boone model at
least at the 10% level. In general, the ﬁndings are consistent between the two  measures of competition
in terms of the statistical signiﬁcance and the sign on the coefﬁcients.
Concentration in the advanced economies has a negative coefﬁcient, implying that in a concentrated
banking-system, a competitive operation is enhanced. This ﬁnding supports the argument in the New
Industrial Organization that concentration is not necessarily an inverse proxy of competition. Claessens
and Laeven (2004) also point out that concentration and competition may  capture different aspects
of banking market-structure, and concentration is unlikely to be a driver of competition. Evidence for
developing countries contradicts this, as the results indicate that concentration impairs competition,
which supports the traditional hypothesis, demonstrating the positive effect of concentrated market
on competition. Jeon et al. (2011) also ﬁnd a similar result using time-varying H-statistics for 17 less-
developed countries over the period of 1997–2008. The competition in the lower-income countries is
also negatively affected by state bank-ownership, and this, coupled with concentration, seems to be
the factor to preserve a sustainable market-power in developing banking-systems. Jeon et al. (2011)
and Claessens and Laeven (2004) ﬁnd the signiﬁcant impact of foreign bank penetration on generating
competition, and our result is in harmony with them for emerging countries. Note also that Yeyati and
Micco (2007) ﬁnd, that while increased concentration did not weaken banking competition for Latin
American banking sectors, foreign penetration has led to a less competitive industry.
We ﬁnd no statistical evidence that variations in bank competition can be explained by regulatory
variables for advanced economies. This suggests that regulations set in the context of macro-prudential
policy may  only hamper banks to take on risky projects, not affecting competition. On the other hand,
contestability theory is well-supported for emerging and developing banking-systems, in which banks
with severe entry- and activity-restrictions face decreasing competition. Being open to new entry
should exert an important competitive pressure on these banking sectors.
A distinctive feature across heterogeneous income groups is also apparent in the inter-industry
variable. The signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of insurance penetration with the negative sign that is found
for the advanced countries in Panel A, draws attention to the fact that the super growth of other
segments of the ﬁnancial-services industry of insurance weakens market-power or strengthens com-
petition in the advanced banking-sector.15 This seems to be an advanced-market speciﬁc feature, since
such a phenomenon is absent in less-developed ﬁnancial markets. We  observe that ﬁnancial freedom
boosts competition in advanced banks, whereas the quality of institutional development, captured by
property rights and the KKZ index, tends to yield a competitive environment among emerging and
developing banks. The latter accords with the result in Delis (2012), who ﬁnds that the impact of
ﬁnancial reform on banking competition is positive if the country has a certain level of institutional
quality.
The coefﬁcients on inﬂation remain signiﬁcant and negative, suggesting that an unstable economic
condition moves in tandem with intensive bank competition.
5.3. Robustness test based on Clerides et al. (2013) dataset
We  run the identical regressions as in Table 3 based on the dataset of Clerides et al. (2013). See
Table 4, where Panel A is the result for the adjusted Lerner index, and Panel B is for the Boone indicator.
Overall, we ﬁnd consistent results with those in Table 3, and underline the robust ﬁndings as follows:
In terms of market-structure, bank concentration is positively correlated with the Lerner index and
15 This is not consistent with the Boone indicator in Panel B, since the coefﬁcient on Insurance penetration is positive. Yet, a
further robustness test using the dataset of Clerides et al. (2013) supports the negative effect.
A. Mirzaei, T. Moore / Int. Fin. Markets, Inst. and Money 32 (2014) 38–71 53
Table 3
Competition model based on World Bank data: main results. Regression results of the model. Competitionct = ˇ0 +  ˝ × Market
structurect +  × Market contestabilityct +  × Inter industryct +  × Institutionct +  × Control variablesct + ϕ × Dummy crisist + εct .
Deﬁnitions of all variables are listed in Table A.3. We estimate all regressions using the two-step GMM  estimator of Arellano
and  Bond. Robust T-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Sargan
test:  the test for over-identifying restrictions in the GMM  dynamic model estimation. AR(1) and AR(2): autocorrelation tests
in  residuals of order 1 and 2, respectively. Note that we  eliminate Number of bank to population as it is ﬁxed over time and
similarly Limit on foreign bank and also Fraction denied, Stock market capitalization, and Stock market efﬁciency as we  have
limited observations and also they perform poorly in baselines results. Sample size varies across regression speciﬁcations, since
not  all variables are available for all countries or for the full sample period (1999–2011).
Panel A: The Lerner index
Advanced vs. emerging vs. developing countries
All Advanced Emerging Developing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.419*** 0.455** 0.353* 0.564***
(5.90) (2.05) (1.78) (5.23)
Market structure
Concentration 0.010* −0.002*** 0.005 0.013**
(1.76) (−3.32) (0.30) (2.07)
Foreign bank
ownership
−0.001** −0.001 −0.003*** −0.002*
(−2.11) (−0.60) (−3.45) (−1.74)
State bank ownership 0.001** −0.001 0.001* 0.002***
(2.38) (−1.46) (1.73) (4.43)
Market contestability
Activity restriction 0.006** 0.008 0.007** 0.012***
2.20) (0.70) (2.16) (4.30)
Financial
conglomeratem
0.002* −0.007 0.021* 0.016***
(1.78) (−1.39) (1.76) (4.46)
Entry  requirement 0.004** 0.006 0.021** 0.008***
(1.97) (1.09) (2.24) (3.43)
Inter-industry
Insurance penetration −0.003* −0.015*** −0.006 0.012
(−1.86) (−4.81) (−0.42) (1.15)
Institution
Financial freedom 0.002 −0.003** 0.002* 0.000
(1.06) (−2.15) (1.72) (0.43)
Property right −0.002*** 0.002 −0.003* −0.000**
(−3.79) (1.12) (−1.68) (−2.07)
KKZ index −0.001** 0.008 −0.144* −0.187***
(−2.07) (0.33) (−1.69) (−5.32)
Control variables
Log (GDP per capita) 0.059*** 0.047 0.143 −0.000
(3.27) (1.21) (1.53) (−0.02)
Bank credit growth −0.002** −0.084* 0.050 −0.004***
(−2.12) (−1.79) (1.48) (−3.63)
GDP growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.62) (0.88) (0.70) (0.82)
Inﬂation −0.003*** −0.013*** −0.003** −0.002***
(−3.88) (−9.12) (−2.04) (−2.96)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.20 0.98 0.99 0.99
AR(1)-(p-value) 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02
AR(2)-(p-value) 0.12 0.75 0.32 0.45
Number of country 146 33 40 73
Number of obs. 521 173 194 154
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Panel B: Boone indicator
Advanced vs. emerging vs. developing countries
All Advanced Emerging Developing
(1)  (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.123*** 0.077*** 0.334*** 0.511***
(24.76) (14.96) (7.11) (31.96)
Market structure
Concentration 0.002*** −0.001* −0.000 0.002***
(3.90) (−1.70) (−0.13) (3.91)
Foreign bank
ownership
−0.002*** −0.000 −0.004*** −0.000
(−17.75) (−0.94) (−10.50) (−0.57)
State bank ownership 0.001* −0.004** −0.001 0.001**
(1.80) (−2.04) (−0.94) (2.04)
Market contestability
Activity restriction 0.002* 0.003 0.001 0.005***
(1.75) (0.69) (0.88) (3.18)
Financial
conglomeratem
0.009*** 0.00 0.003** −0.002
(3.37) (0.60) (2.29) (−0.60)
Entry requirement 0.004 0.001 0.008* 0.023**
(1.53) (0.41) (1.78) (2.07)
Inter-industry
Insurance penetration 0.017*** 0.010** −0.004*** 0.004
(3.77) (2.51) (−3.31) (0.59)
Institution
Financial freedom −0.000 −0.001*** 0.000 0.001***
(−0.46) (−4.47) (1.32) (3.82)
Property right −0.001*** −0.001 −0.001*** −0.001***
(−2.92) (−0.72) (−3.31) (−4.24)
KKZ index −0.043*** 0.042 −0.024* −0.036**
(−4.49) (1.19) (−1.79) (−1.98)
Control variables
Log (GDP per capita) 0.010* −0.143*** 0.005 0.042***
(1.86) (−2.62) (0.79) (7.17)
Bank  credit growth 0.001 0.047 −0.002 −0.001
(0.84) (1.29) (−0.14) (−0.99)
GDP growth −0.000 −0.000 −0.003*** −0.000
(−1.00) (−0.50) (−9.53) (−1.50)
Inﬂation −0.001** −0.001 −0.001*** −0.000
(−2.28) (−0.22) (−2.99) (−0.13)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.07 0.96 0.99 0.97
AR(1)-(p-value) 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.19
AR(2)-(p-value) 0.60 0.21 0.40 0.29
Number of country 146 33 40 73
Number of obs. 551 177 204 170
the Boone indicator for developing economies, conﬁrming that concentration enhances competition,
whereas, in reverse, concentration in the advanced banking-sector is negatively related to the Boone
indicator. Foreign bank-ownership threatens market-power in banks located in emerging countries,
whilst state bank-ownership seems to impair bank competition in developing economies. We  again
ﬁnd no evidence that contestability theory holds for the banking system in advanced economies.
Most of the contestability variables remain to be signiﬁcant for emerging and developing economies.
The preferable effect of insurance penetration is still observed for advanced economies. We  ﬁnd that
ﬁnancial freedom continues to weaken the market power of the advanced banking sector, and the
effect of property rights and the KKZ index remains robust for less developed countries.
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Table 4
Competition model based on Clerides et al. (2013) data: robustness test. Regression results of the model
Competitionct = ˇ0 +  ˝ × Market structurect +  × Market contestabilityct +  × Inter industryct +  × Institutionct +  × Control
variablesct + ϕ × Dummy  crisist + εct . Deﬁnitions of all variables are listed in Table A.3. We estimate all regressions using the
two-step GMM  estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991). Robust T-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance levels
at  the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Sargan test: the test for over-identifying restrictions in the GMM  dynamic model estima-
tion.  AR(1) and AR(2): autocorrelation tests in residuals of order 1 and 2, respectively. Sample size varies across regression
speciﬁcations as not all variables are available for all countries or for the full sample period (1999–2010).
Panel A: Adjusted Lerner index
Advanced vs. emerging vs. developing countries
All Advanced Emerging Developing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.537*** 0.319*** 0.378*** 0.463**
(9.09) (2.97) (3.16) (2.46)
Market structure
Concentration 0.001* −0.001 0.002 0.003***
(1.67) (−1.07) (0.98) (2.68)
Foreign bank
ownership
−0.001 0.001 −0.001** −0.001
(−0.33) (1.31) (−2.16) (−1.14)
State bank ownership 0.001*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.002*
(3.79) (1.01) (2.80) (1.72)
Market contestability
Activity restriction 0.003* −0.000 0.003* 0.010**
(1.89) (−0.11) (1.71) (2.45)
Financial
conglomeratem
0.005** −0.003 0.001 0.011**
(2.14) (−0.89) (0.42) (2.30)
Entry  requirement 0.005*** −0.027 0.018*** 0.008**
(3.03) (−1.31) (4.48) (1.98)
Inter-industry
Insurance penetration −0.010** −0.001** −0.001 0.030
(−2.38) (−1.94) (−0.13) (1.62)
Institution
Financial freedom −0.001 −0.002* 0.001* −0.000
(0.90) (−1.87) (1.72) (−0.40)
Property right −0.002** −0.000 −0.002*** −0.002**
(−2.06) (−0.34) (−2.77) (−2.32)
KKZ index −0.047* −0.008 −0.072** −0.130*
(−1.77) (−0.16) (−2.04) (−1.86)
Control variables
Log (GDP per capita) −0.006 0.017 −0.012 −0.032**
(−0.83) (0.92) (−0.77) (−2.00)
Bank credit growth −0.001 −0.040 0.022 −0.000
(−1.56) (−1.33) (0.64) (−0.27)
GDP growth 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(6.52) (4.40) (5.60) (3.31)
Inﬂation −0.004*** −0.014*** −0.003** −0.002*
(−5.56) (−6.80) (−2.32) (−1.73)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.08 0.75 0.98 0.82
AR(1)-(p-value) 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.07
AR(2)-(p-value) 0.64 0.22 0.89 0.79
Number of country 128 32 40 56
Number of obs. 492 163 179 150
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Table 4 (Continued)
Panel B: Boone indicator
Advanced vs. emerging vs. developing countries
All Advanced Emerging Developing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.920*** 0.720*** 0.209** 0.652***
(17.76) (5.81) (2.20) (13.17)
Market structure
Concentration 0.001** −0.001* 0.001 0.002**
(2.28) (−1.79) (0.30) (2.16)
Foreign bank
ownership
−0.001* 0.001 −0.001* −0.001
(−1.77) (0.64) (−1.80) (−0.40)
State bank ownership 0.001** −0.001*** 0.000 0.003***
(2.13) (−3.04) (0.31) (2.62)
Market contestability
Activity restriction 0.008*** 0.005 0.004** 0.002**
(3.01) (0.92) (2.05) (2.10)
Financial
conglomeratem
0.003* −0.000 0.008* 0.004**
(1.78) (−0.03) (1.84) (2.21)
Entry  requirement 0.003*** 0.008 0.019 0.001**
(2.94) (0.77) (−1.05) (2.18)
Inter-industry
Insurance penetration −0.002* −0.012* 0.001 0.009
(−1.83) (−1.78) (0.28) (1.53)
Institution
Financial freedom −0.000 −0.001*** 0.001 −0.000
(−0.62) (−3.23) (1.28) (−0.24)
Property right −0.001 0.001 −0.002** −0.001*
(−1.34) (1.03) (−2.12) (−1.92)
KKZ index −0.044*** −0.018 −0.069* −0.045***
(−3.33) (−0.24) (−1.96) (−2.61)
Control variables
Log (GDP per capita) −0.004 −0.023 0.037 0.006
(−0.64) (−1.09) (1.53) (0.83)
Bank  credit growth 0.000** −0.111** 0.002 0.001*
(2.54) (−2.17) (0.11) (1.65)
GDP  growth 0.000 −0.001 0.001** 0.001***
(0.05) (−0.80) (2.48) (3.13)
Inﬂation −0.003*** −0.017*** −0.004*** −0.001**
(−4.22) (−7.21) (−4.40) (−2.00)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.17 0.88 0.90 0.99
AR(1)-(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.04
AR(2)-(p-value) 0.70 0.55 0.16 0.88
Number of country 128 32 40 56
Number of obs. 492 163 179 150
5.4. Further robustness test based on bank-level data
Following Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Jeon et al. (2011), our empirical testing proceeds in
two steps. Firstly, we estimate the measures of competition, as speciﬁed in Eqs. (1)–(3) in Section
3 for the Lerner index at a bank-level. Secondly, we estimate a linear model by augmenting Eq. (4)
with bank-speciﬁc traits as additional control variables to verify that our results are not affected by
differences in banking management across countries. We  specify ﬁve bank-level variables, i.e. bank
size, bank equity, share of wholesale funding, lending and bank fee income. Large banks may  operate
in international markets that are competitive, hence bank size may  matter. It is measured by taking
the natural logarithm of bank assets in US million dollars. It is argued that well-capitalized banks face
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Table 5
Competition model based on bank-level data for the Lerner index: Robustness test Regression results of
the  model Competitionict = ˇ0 + ı × Bank controlict +  ˝ × Market structurect +  × Market contestabilityct +  × Inter
industryct +  × Institutionct +  × Control variablesct + ϕ × Dummy crisist + εict . Deﬁnitions of all variables are listed in
Table A.2. We  estimate all regressions using the two-step GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991). Robust T-values are in
parentheses. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Sargan test: the test for over-identifying
restrictions in the GMM  dynamic model estimation. AR(1) and AR(2): autocorrelation tests in residuals of order 1 and 2,
respectively, are 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). Sample period (1999–2011).
Advanced vs. emerging vs. developing countries
All Advanced Emerging Developing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.721*** 0.339*** 0.567*** 0.466***
(26.89) (10.68) (18.19) (7.26)
Bank  control
Log (size) −0.025*** −0.035*** −0.021*** −0.011*
(−6.10) (−3.18) (−5.39) (−1.77)
Capital adequacy 0.010 −0.237 −0.018 0.307***
(0.32) (−1.61) (−0.66) (5.04)
Share  of wholesale
funding
0.015* 0.052*** −0.012* −0.029
(1.75) (3.90) (−1.75) (−1.26)
Lending −0.052*** 0.004 −0.003 −0.031
(−2.80) (0.11) (−0.17) (−0.74)
Diversiﬁcation −0.170*** −0.135*** 1.211*** 1.147***
(−11.78) (−10.44) (5.43) (4.18)
Market structure
Concentration 0.005*** −0.001 0.002*** 0.008***
(12.55) (−0.78) (4.22) (13.61)
Foreign bank
ownership
0.001 −0.001 −0.004*** −0.006***
(0.02) (−0.47) (−5.48) (−6.07)
State bank ownership 0.002*** 0.001 −0.001 0.002***
(2.80) (1.05) (−1.41) (3.39)
Market contestability
Activity restriction 0.002* −0.008 0.002 0.016***
(1.85) (−0.84) (1.34) (4.94)
Financial
conglomeratem
0.006* 0.012 0.043*** 0.014***
(1.67) (0.84) (9.79) (3.65)
Entry  requirement 0.033*** 0.068*** 0.050*** 0.010**
(4.66) (7.28) (3.26) (2.32)
Inter-industry
Insurance penetration −0.003 −0.007* 0.002 0.006
(−1.63) (−1.69) (1.03) (1.40)
Institution
Financial freedom −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.001 0.001***
(−4.91) (−4.38) (−1.42) (2.84)
Property right −0.004*** 0.001 −0.005*** −0.001*
(−9.74) (1.54) (−8.78) (−1.70)
KKZ index −0.121*** 0.139*** −0.113*** −0.096*
(−8.37) (5.04) (−3.82) (−1.76)
Control variables
Log (GDP per capita) 0.039** 0.065 −0.035** −0.016
(2.33) (1.40) (−2.22) (−1.06)
Bank credit growth 0.022** 0.334*** 0.004 0.006**
(2.56) (10.82) (0.26) (2.31)
GDP  growth 0.001*** −0.004*** −0.002*** −0.001*
(3.50) (−10.52) (−3.29) (−1.75)
Inﬂation 0.004*** 0.032*** −0.004*** 0.005***
(7.49) (20.38) (−5.87) (5.70)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.15 0.25 0.09 0.07
AR(1)-(p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
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Table 5 (Continued)
Advanced vs. emerging vs. developing countries
All Advanced Emerging Developing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AR(2)-(p-value) 0.36 0.67 0.22 0.38
Number of country 134 33 40 61
Number of obs. 15273 9111 5113 1049
lower funding costs and have larger net interest margins, hence we  specify the ratio of equity to total
assets. By including the share of wholesale funding, we  are able to control the degree of dependence
on money-markets for the source of bank funds. The higher dependence on short-term borrowing
may  have repercussions on bank competition. By introducing fee income measured by the ratio of
non-interest-operating income to total assets as a proxy of diversiﬁcation, we control for different
product mixes in assessing the impact of bank-regulations, concentration and institutions on bank
competition. Lending as the ratio of loans to assets is also speciﬁed. We  expect that the operation of
those banks which have the higher ratio follows traditional bank activities, implying that competition
among such banks may  be less. The contemporaneous terms enter into the model for the bank-speciﬁc
characteristics. However, to address potential endogeneity issues with the dependent variable, and
also correlation with the determinants, GMM  is also employed here using the lagged variables as
instrument variables.
The regression results based on these bank-level controlling variables are reported in Table 5.
It appears that the relationship between banking competition and these bank-speciﬁc factors are
independently informative. Given the negative signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on bank size for all income
groups, the robust ﬁnding is that large banks are facing greater competition across countries. Evidence
also suggests that an increase in diversiﬁcation enhances competition for advanced banks, whereas
it impairs competition for emerging and developing economies. The latter reﬂects the less-developed
ﬁnancial sector, where fee income activities are still underdeveloped and mainly practised in less-
competitive environments. It is also found that in developing countries, a high capital adequacy is a
source of market-power.
While controlling the bank-speciﬁc factors, the main results in Table 3 are sustained in terms of
statistical signiﬁcance and the direction of the effect. The noteworthy points are as follows: There
is a clear picture that concentrated banking-systems enhance market-power for developing banking
sectors. It is veriﬁed that foreign asset penetration enhances competition in emerging economies, and
state bank-ownership is negatively associated with competition in developing economies. Contesta-
bility remains to be a strong source to boost market-power for less-developed countries, preserving
the contestability hypothesis for emerging and developing income countries. Insurance and ﬁnancial
freedom are consistently the main drivers of greater competition in developed countries. The effect of
the institutional factors of Property rights and the KKZ index on emerging and developing economies
is also hardly altered by the bank-level data approach.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we attempt to investigate the driving forces of competition in banking sectors by
distinguishing banks located in developed, emerging and developing countries. The competition model
is estimated by employing the Lerner index and the Boone indicator for 146 countries. Some empirical
results are diverse across different income-groups of countries.
The evidence reveals that a more concentrated banking system seems to face greater competition
for advanced economies, whereas it would hamper competition for developing economies. The nature
of ownership matters for competition, speciﬁcally, the penetration of foreign banks seems to be ben-
eﬁcial to emerging economies. Developing countries with less state-owned bank assets have a more
competitive banking sector, hence less intervention of government is contributory to the creation
of a competitive banking-industry for low-income countries. Fewer entry and activity restrictions in
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the less-developed banking sectors are associated with competitive banking systems, whereas we
ﬁnd no evidence that contestability theory holds in advanced economies. Banks located in countries
with good-quality institutional development face greater competition for emerging and developing
economies. Inter-industry competition from insurance industries, together with ﬁnancial freedom,
seem to be the main drivers in increasing competition amongst developed economies. The enhance-
ment of the rivalry from non-bank ﬁnancial industries should be encouraged to prevent the dominance
of the banking sector in developed ﬁnancial markets, in this respect. Many of these results survive
robustness tests, even after controlling for bank-speciﬁc factors.
Our ﬁndings advance the literature on an important topic, with direct implications for public policy
towards banking-structure and regulations for the respective income-group of countries. In particular,
for the developing economies, there is scope for raising competitiveness by preventing excessive
concentration in their banking sector. It is argued that market structure indicators may  have become
less valuable as a driving force of competition, and it necessitates a reassessment of competition policy
(Claessens and Laeven, 2004). Our evidence suggests that this applies to developed and emerging
countries, however, traditional competition policy in the ﬁnancial sector may  yet allow more rein to
the forces of competition for low income countries.
Appendix A.
Table A.1
Sample selection and number of countries in the sample.
All Drop Remaining
Panel A: Sample selection of the main dataset of the study
All  countries in Bank Regulation and Supervision
Database
180 180
Less
Countries not included in Global Financial
Development Databasea
13 167
Countries included but limited observation of Lerner
and Boone indicators in Global Financial Development
Databaseb
21 146
Final  sample 146
Panel  B: Sample selection for Clerides et al. (2013) – for robustness
All  countries 148 148
Countries not included in our main dataset (Panel A) 20 128
Final  sample 128
Panel  C: Sample selection of bank-level data – for robustness
All  countries in BankScope 192 192
Less
Countries with less than 5 banks 40 152
U.S.  1 151
Countries not listed in ﬁnal sample of our main dataset
(Panel A)
17 134
Final  sample 134
Criteria for selecting banks
All commercial, cooperative and savings banks 8236 8236
Less
Inactive banks 719 7517
All  banks 7517
a Anguilla, Cook Islands, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Jersey, Montserrat, Palestinian, Puerto Rico, Serbia and Montenegro, Taiwan,
Turks and Caicos Island, Virgin Islands, and Yugoslavia.
b Aruba, Central Africa Rep., Chad, Congo Rep., Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Isle of Man, Kosovo,
Liechtenstein, Maldives, Papua New Guinea, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Turkmenistan, and
Zimbabwe.
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Table A.2
Average of country-level bank competition (WB: World Bank 1999–2011; Clerides et al. 1999–2010).
Row Country Code Economy Lerner index Boone indicator Clerides et al. (2013)
Obs. Mean Sd. Dv. Obs. Mean Sd. Dv. Adj. Lerner Boone
1 Albania ALB Dev. 13 0.26 0.04 13 −0.02 0.02 0.25 −0.43
2  Algeria DZA Dev. 13 0.43 0.21 13 0.01 0.02 0.26 −0.47
3  Angola AGO Dev. 13 0.44 0.09 13 −0.07 0.03 0.26 −0.41
4  Antigua
and
Barbuda
ATG Dev. 9 −0.48 0.30 0.18 −0.43
5  Argentina ARG Eme. 13 0.24 0.09 13 −0.03 0.10 0.14 −0.47
6  Armenia ARM Dev. 13 0.30 0.08 13 −0.22 0.03 0.26 −0.46
7  Australia AUS Adv. 12 0.11 0.04 13 0.09 0.18 0.16 −0.47
8  Austria AUT Adv. 13 0.20 0.04 13 −0.06 0.01 0.11 −0.49
9  Azerbaijan AZE Dev. 13 0.33 0.08 13 −0.10 0.03 0.27 −0.47
10  Bahrain BHR Eme. 13 0.32 0.07 13 −0.05 0.02 0.18 −0.58
11  Bangladesh BGD Eme. 13 0.28 0.11 13 −0.07 0.02 0.14 −0.44
12  Belarus BLR Dev. 12 0.21 0.05 13 0.47 0.27 0.11 −0.50
13  Belgium BEL Adv. 13 0.23 0.03 13 −0.09 0.03 0.10 −0.49
14  Belize BLZ Dev. 9 0.38 0.07 11 −0.03 0.02
15  Benin BEN Dev. 13 0.25 0.06 13 0.02 0.03
16  Bhutan BTN Dev. 13 −0.07 0.04
17  Bolivia BOL Dev. 13 0.18 0.07 13 −0.08 0.03 0.13 −0.40
18  Bosnia and
Herzeg.
BIH Dev. 8 0.22 0.04 13 −0.04 0.01 0.11 −0.44
19  Botswana BWA  Dev. 12 0.24 0.05 13 −0.13 0.02 0.30 −0.40
20  Brazil BRA Eme. 13 0.18 0.06 13 −0.17 0.02 0.15 −0.49
21  Bulgaria BGR Eme. 11 0.35 0.04 13 −0.09 0.02 0.29 −0.41
22  Burkina
Faso
BFA Dev. 13 0.30 0.04 13 −0.09 0.02 0.23 −0.40
23  Burundi BDI Dev. 13 0.39 0.10 13 −0.15 0.05
24  Cambodia KHM Dev. 11 0.38 0.09 11 0.03 0.07 0.32 −0.44
25  Cameroon CMR  Dev. 13 0.42 0.07 13 −0.04 0.01 0.31 −0.41
26  Canada CAN Adv. 12 0.18 0.03 13 −0.11 0.03 0.17 −0.40
27  Cayman
Islands
CYM Dev. 12 0.32 0.07 13 −0.04 0.02
28  Chile CHL Eme. 12 0.27 0.07 13 −0.05 0.03 0.20 −0.45
29  China CHN Eme. 12 0.36 0.10 13 −0.02 0.01 0.30 −0.41
30  Colombia COL Eme. 13 0.23 0.10 13 −0.07 0.02 0.16 −0.42
31  Costa Rica CRI Dev. 13 0.20 0.07 13 −0.08 0.02 0.16 −0.48
32  Cote
d’Ivoire
CIV Dev. 13 0.24 0.03 13 −0.06 0.02 0.19 −0.40
33  Croatia HRV Dev. 13 0.22 0.05 13 −0.10 0.02 0.21 −0.42
34  Cyprus CYP Adv. 13 0.22 0.07 13 0.01 0.03 0.13 −0.45
35  Czech
Republic
CZE Adv. 13 0.16 0.07 13 −0.21 0.12 0.25 −0.42
36  Denmark DNK Adv. 12 0.26 0.10 13 −0.07 0.02 0.16 −0.50
37  Dominican
Republic
DOM Dev. 13 0.19 0.06 13 −0.23 0.06 0.17 −0.46
38  Ecuador ECU Dev. 12 0.14 0.07 12 −0.02 0.02 0.16 −0.42
39  Egypt, Arab
Rep.
EGY Eme. 5 0.14 0.19 13 −0.08 0.01 0.20 −0.43
40  El Salvador SLV Dev. 13 0.37 0.10 13 −0.09 0.08 0.20 −0.42
41  Estonia EST Adv. 12 0.20 0.08 13 0.08 0.06 0.19 −0.44
42  Ethiopia ETH Dev. 13 0.48 0.09 13 −0.03 0.01 0.46 −0.42
43  Finland FIN Adv. 10 −0.07 0.55 13 0.42 1.79 0.23 −0.39
44  France FRA Adv. 13 0.17 0.05 13 −0.05 0.01 0.15 −0.46
45  Gabon GAB Dev. 13 −0.04 0.01
46  Gambia,
The
GMB  Dev. 13 0.35 0.15 12 0.06 0.07 0.41 −0.39
47  Georgia GEO Dev. 13 0.33 0.08 13 −0.10 0.03 0.21 −0.48
48  Germany DEU Adv. 12 0.16 0.03 13 −0.04 0.01 0.09 −0.42
49  Ghana GHA Dev. 12 0.33 0.13 13 −0.19 0.02 0.31 −0.41
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Table A.2 (Continued)
Row Country Code Economy Lerner index Boone indicator Clerides et al. (2013)
Obs. Mean Sd. Dv. Obs. Mean Sd. Dv. Adj. Lerner Boone
50 Greece GRC Adv. 11 0.23 0.14 8 −0.07 0.08 0.10 −0.41
51  Grenada GRD Dev. 13 −0.08 0.04
52  Guatemala GTM Dev. 13 −0.13 0.05 0.19 −0.50
53  Guinea GIN Dev. 10 0.03 0.06
54  Guyana GUY Dev. 13 −0.05 0.01
55  Honduras HND Dev. 13 0.18 0.05 13 −0.04 0.02 0.16 −0.42
56  Hong Kong
SAR, China
HKG Adv. 12 0.30 0.08 13 −0.07 0.19 0.25 −0.46
57  Hungary HUN Eme. 13 0.09 0.06 13 −0.09 0.03 0.13 −0.45
58  Iceland ISL Adv. 12 0.18 0.13 8 −0.10 0.10 0.20 −0.56
59  India IND Eme. 13 0.24 0.04 13 −0.06 0.01 0.14 −0.46
60  Indonesia IDN Eme. 13 0.17 0.06 13 −0.03 0.01 0.19 −0.48
61  Ireland IRL Adv. 12 0.22 0.05 13 −0.01 0.01
62  Israel ISR Adv. 12 0.19 0.03 13 −0.04 0.01 0.09 −0.43
63  Italy ITA Adv. 12 0.19 0.03 13 −0.04 0.03 0.17 −0.42
64  Jamaica JAM Dev. 11 0.32 0.05 9 −0.09 0.01 0.26 −0.43
65  Japan JPN Adv. 13 0.21 0.14 13 −0.02 0.01 0.14 −0.35
66  Jordan JOR Eme. 13 0.32 0.09 13 −0.06 0.01 0.27 −0.42
67  Kazakhstan KAZ Dev. 13 0.29 0.05 13 −0.07 0.04 0.20 −0.54
68  Kenya KEN Dev. 13 0.28 0.08 13 −0.07 0.01 0.29 −0.39
69  Korea, Rep. KOR Adv. 12 0.31 0.03 120 0.07 0.06 0.14 −0.52
70  Kuwait KWT  Eme. 13 0.47 0.08 13 −0.08 0.03 0.41 −0.52
71  Kyrgyz
Republic
KGZ Dev. 11 0.38 0.13 11 −0.01 0.05 0.30 −0.41
72  Latvia LVA Eme. 13 0.21 0.06 13 −0.04 0.03 0.23 −0.43
73  Lebanon LBN Dev. 13 0.17 0.04 13 −0.07 0.01 0.13 −0.56
74  Lesotho LSO Dev. 13 0.00 0.02
75  Lithuania LTU Eme. 12 0.14 0.05 13 −0.03 0.05 0.18 −0.42
76  Luxembourg LUX Adv. 13 0.10 0.06 13 −0.05 0.01 0.16 −0.50
77  Macao SAR,
China
MAC  Dev. 13 0.14 0.08 13 0.01 0.01 0.26 −0.45
78  Macedonia,
FYR
MKD  Dev. 13 0.27 0.05 13 −0.08 0.01 0.19 −0.41
79  Madagascar MDG  Dev. 13 0.34 0.08 13 −0.02 0.02 0.35 −0.41
80  Malawi MWI  Dev. 12 0.26 0.09 13 −0.09 0.02 0.36 −0.45
81  Malaysia MYS  Eme. 13 0.30 0.18 13 −0.03 0.01 0.28 −0.41
82  Mali MLI  Dev. 13 0.27 0.05 13 −0.09 0.01 0.19 −0.40
83  Malta MLT  Adv. 12 0.24 0.07 13 −0.05 0.01 0.28 −0.44
84  Mauritius MUS  Eme. 13 0.42 0.12 13 −0.05 0.01 0.25 −0.54
85  Mexico MEX  Eme. 13 −0.04 0.03 0.09 −0.62
86  Moldova MDA  Dev. 13 0.27 0.09 13 −0.13 0.04 0.29 −0.47
87  Montenegro MNE  Dev. 10 0.04 0.07 9 −0.05 0.04 0.11 −0.40
88  Morocco MAR  Eme. 13 0.27 0.05 13 −0.03 0.01 0.23 −0.42
89  Mozambique MOZ  Dev. 12 0.24 0.07 13 2.25 1.24 0.26 −0.40
90  Myanmar MMR  Dev. 7 −0.07 0.12
91  Namibia NAM Dev. 8 0.03 0.03 0.19 −0.45
92  Nepal NPL Dev. 13 0.20 0.22 13 −0.07 0.01 0.30 −0.44
93  Netherlands NLD Adv. 12 0.17 0.03 13 0.03 0.04 0.15 −0.50
94  New
Zealand
NZL Adv. 13 0.15 0.05 13 −0.24 0.31 0.19 −0.50
95  Nicaragua NIC Dev. 13 −0.01 0.02 0.24 −0.42
96  Niger NER Dev. 13 0.20 0.14 13 −0.11 0.04 0.17 −0.40
97  Nigeria NGA Eme. 13 0.21 0.25 13 −0.07 0.03 0.23 −0.42
98  Norway NOR Adv. 12 0.22 0.06 13 −0.01 0.05 0.18 −0.45
99  Oman OMN  Eme. 13 0.40 0.05 13 −0.01 0.02 0.29 −0.41
100  Pakistan PAK Eme. 13 0.15 0.11 13 −0.03 0.03 0.20 −0.45
101  Panama PAN Dev. 13 0.38 0.05 13 −0.11 0.02 0.25 −0.44
102  Paraguay PRY Dev. 13 0.09 0.13 13 −0.15 0.16 0.07 −0.57
103  Peru PER Eme. 13 0.31 0.08 13 −0.04 0.02 0.22 −0.41
104  Philippines PHL Eme. 13 0.11 0.12 13 −0.17 0.16 0.17 −0.43
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Table A.2 (Continued)
Row Country Code Economy Lerner index Boone indicator Clerides et al. (2013)
Obs. Mean Sd. Dv. Obs. Mean Sd. Dv. Adj. Lerner Boone
105 Poland POL Eme. 13 0.19 0.07 13 −0.12 0.03 0.15 −0.45
106  Portugal PRT Adv. 13 0.28 0.11 13 −0.11 0.07 0.12 −0.53
107  Qatar QAT Eme. 13 0.47 0.09 13 0.02 0.04 0.39 −0.45
108  Romania ROM Eme. 13 0.22 0.05 13 −0.06 0.04 0.17 −0.51
109  Russian
Federation
RUS Eme. 13 0.17 0.09 13 −0.04 0.01 0.27 −0.48
110  Rwanda RWA  Dev. 13 0.31 0.09 11 −0.17 0.02 0.21 −0.39
111  Saint Kitts
and Nevis
KNA Dev. 13 −0.03 0.03
112  Samoa WSM  Dev. 13 −0.02 0.03
113 Saudi
Arabia
SAU Eme. 13 0.47 0.10 13 −0.05 0.02 0.30 −0.42
114  Senegal SEN Dev. 13 0.33 0.03 13 −0.07 0.01 0.27 −0.40
115  Serbia SRB Dev. 11 0.24 0.12 13 −0.36 0.44 0.17 −0.41
116  Sierra
Leone
SLE Dev. 12 0.35 0.20 12 −0.10 0.05 0.37 −0.40
117  Singapore SGP Adv. 13 0.21 0.13 13 −0.01 0.05 0.32 −0.47
118  Slovak
Republic
SVK Adv. 13 0.14 0.07 13 −0.10 0.03 0.21 −0.45
119  Slovenia SVN Adv. 13 0.25 0.04 13 −0.11 0.03 0.16 −0.44
120  South
Africa
ZAF Eme. 13 0.25 0.04 11 −0.10 0.04 0.15 −0.44
121  Spain ESP Adv. 13 0.16 0.08 13 0.18 0.14 0.19 −0.49
122  Sri Lanka LKA Eme. 12 0.20 0.04 13 −0.18 0.03 0.13 −0.51
123  Sudan SDN Eme. 13 0.31 0.12 13 0.01 0.03 0.18 −0.49
124  Suriname SUR Dev. 13 −0.02 0.02
125  Swaziland SWZ  Dev. 12 0.19 0.05 13 −0.56 0.23
126  Sweden SWE  Adv. 13 0.23 0.05 13 −0.05 0.02 0.19 −0.47
127  Switzerland CHE Adv. 13 0.21 0.03 13 −0.06 0.01 0.12 −0.45
128  Syrian Arab
Republic
SYR Dev. 7 0.28 0.19 7 0.07 0.09 0.42 −0.43
129  Tajikistan TJK Dev. 7 −0.22 0.95
130  Tanzania TZA Dev. 9 0.33 0.07 9 −0.09 0.03 0.36 −0.37
131  Thailand THA Eme. 13 0.11 0.23 13 −0.05 0.01 0.21 −0.42
132  Togo TGO Dev. 13 0.25 0.09 12 −0.10 0.04 0.27 −0.40
133  Trinidad
and Tobago
TTO Dev. 12 0.34 0.04 13 0.02 0.05 0.30 −0.45
134  Tunisia TUN Eme. 13 0.24 0.05 13 −0.03 0.01 0.19 −0.47
135  Turkey TUR Eme. 12 0.21 0.06 13 −0.15 0.26 0.17 −0.57
136  Uganda UGA Dev. 5 0.33 0.05 13 −0.11 0.01 0.33 −0.39
137  Ukraine UKR Eme. 12 0.21 0.10 13 −0.14 0.26 0.13 −0.52
138  United
Arab
Emirates
ARE Eme. 13 0.42 0.09 13 −0.04 0.01 0.36 −0.45
139  United
Kingdom
GBR Adv. 13 0.23 0.09 13 −0.04 0.01 0.19 −0.44
140  United
States
USA Adv. 13 0.27 0.05 13 −0.07 0.01 0.22 −0.40
141  Uruguay URY Dev. 13 0.11 0.09 13 −0.07 0.06 0.13 −0.50
142  Vanuatu VUT Dev. 9 −0.01 0.01
143  Venezuela,
RB
VEN Eme. 13 0.24 0.06 13 −0.13 0.03 0.22 −0.41
144  Vietnam VNM Eme. 13 0.25 0.04 13 −0.07 0.01 0.23 −0.49
145  Yemen,
Rep.
YEM Dev. 13 0.01 0.02 0.14 −0.46
146  Zambia ZMB  Dev. 13 0.18 0.15 13 −0.12 0.04 0.20 −0.38
Mean  12.4 0.25 0.08 12.5 −0.05 0.07 0.21 −0.45
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Table A.3
Deﬁnition of variables.
Variable Description Source
i. Dependent variables
Lerner index A measure of market power in the banking
market. It compares output pricing and
marginal costs (that is, markup). An increase in
the Lerner index indicates a deterioration of
the competitive conduct of ﬁnancial
intermediaries.
World Bank: The Global
Financial Development
Database. Martin Cˇihák et al.
(2012).
Boone indicator A measure of degree of com petition based on
proﬁt-efﬁciency in the banking market. It is
calculated as the elasticity of proﬁts to
marginal costs. An increase in the Boone
indicator implies a deterioration of the
competitive conduct of ﬁnancial
intermediaries.
World Bank: The Global
Financial Development
Database. Martin Cˇihák et al.
(2012).
ii.  Explanatory variables
Market structure
Concentration Assets of ﬁve largest banks as a share of total
commercial banking assets. Total assets
include total earning assets, cash and due from
banks, foreclosed real estate, ﬁxed assets,
goodwill, other intangibles. Current tax assets,
deferred tax, discontinued operations and
other assets.
World Bank: The Global
Financial Development
Database. Martin Cˇihák et al.
(2012).
Number of banks to population The ratio of the number of banks in the country
per 100,000 people.
Barth et al. (2001) and authors’
calculation based on
BankScope for missing
countries
Foreign bank ownership The extent to which the banking system’s
assets a re foreign owned which is the fraction
of  the banking system’s assets that is 50% or
more foreign owned.
World Bank surveys on bank
regulation. Surveys on bank
regulation were conducted in
1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011,
covering 180 countries. Barth
et al. (2013)
State bank ownership The extent to which the banking system’s
assets are government owned which is the
fraction of the banking system’s assets that is
50% or more government owned.
World Bank surveys on bank
regulation. Surveys on bank
regulation were conducted in
1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011,
covering 180 countries. Barth
et al. (2013)
Market contestability
Activity restriction A variable that ranges from zero to twelve,
with twelve indicating the highest restrictions
on bank activities. The activity restrictions
include restrictions on securities activities,
insurance activities, and real estate activities. A
value of 1 is added to the index if an activity is
unrestricted, 2 if it is permitted, 3 if it is
restricted, and 4 if it is prohibited.
World Bank surveys on bank
regulation. Surveys on bank
regulation were conducted in
1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011,
covering 180 countries. Barth
et al. (2013)
Financial conglomerate A variable that ranges from zero to twelve,
with twelve indicating the highest restrictions
on bank conglomerate. The ﬁnancial
conglomerate includes the extent to which
banks may  own and control nonﬁnancial ﬁrms,
the extent to which nonﬁnancial ﬁrms may
own and control banks, and the extent to
which nonbank ﬁnancial ﬁrms may  own and
control banks.
World Bank surveys on bank
regulation. Surveys on bank
regulation were conducted in
1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011,
covering 180 countries. Barth
et al. (2013)
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Table A.3 (Continued)
Variable Description Source
Limit on foreign bank A variable that measures whether foreign
banks may  own domestic banks and whether
foreign banks may  enter a country’s banking
industry. It examines are foreign entities
prohibited from entering through: Acquisition,
Subsidiary, and Branch? The indicator ranges
from zero to four, with Lower values indicate
greater stringency.
World Bank surveys on bank
regulation. Surveys on bank
regulation were conducted in
1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011,
covering 180 countries. Barth
et al. (2013)
Entry requirement Entry requirement measures whether various
types of legal submissions are required to
obtain a ban king license. It examines whether
the eight documents (such as draft by-laws,
intended organization chart) are legally
required to be submitted before issuance of the
ban king license. The indicator ranges from
zero to eight, with higher values indicate
greater stringency.
World Bank surveys on bank
regulation. Surveys on bank
regulation were conducted in
1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011,
covering 180 countries. Barth
et al. (2013)
Fraction denied The percentage of applications (both domestic
and foreign) to enter banking denied in the
past ﬁve years.
World Bank surveys on bank
regulation. Surveys on bank
regulation were conducted in
1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011,
covering 180 countries. Barth
et al. (2013)
Inter-industry
Insurance penetration Ratio of life and non-life insurance premium
volume to GDP. Premium volume is the
insurer’s direct premiums earned (if
Property/Casualty) or received (if Life/Health)
during the previous calendar year.
World Bank: The Global
Financial Development
Database. Martin Cˇihák et al.
(2012)
Market capitalization Stock market capitalization of listed companies
to GDP. Market capitalization is calculated by
multiplying a company’s shares outstanding by
the current market price of one share.
World Bank: World
Development Indicators.
Stock  market efﬁciency Stock market turnover ratio as an indicator of
market efﬁciency. Turnover ratio is the total
value of shares traded during the period
divided by the average market capitalization
for the period.
World Bank: World
Development Indicators.
Institution
Financial freedom Financial freedom is a measure of banking
efﬁciency as well as a measure of
independence from government control and
interference in the ﬁnancial sector. The Index
scores an economy’s ﬁnancial freedom by
looking into ﬁve broad a re as: (i) The extent of
government regulation of ﬁnancial services, (ii)
The degree of state intervention in banks and
other ﬁnancial ﬁrms through direct and
indirect ownership, (iii) The extent of ﬁnancial
and capital market development, (iv)
Government inﬂuence on the allocation of
credit, and (v) Openness to foreign
competition. An overall score on a scale of 0 to
100 is given to an economy’s ﬁnancial freedom
through deductions from the ideal score of 100.
Heritage Foundation Data base.
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Table A.3 (Continued)
Variable Description Source
Property rights Property right measures the degree to which a
country’s laws protect private property rights
and the degree to which its government
enforces those laws. It also assesses the
likelihood that private property will be
expropriated and analyzes the independence
of the judiciary, the existence of corruption
within the judiciary, and the ability of
individuals and businesses to enforce
contracts. It ranges from 0 to 100. A higher
score indicates better protection of property
rights and signify greater protection of private
property rights.
Heritage Foundation Data base.
KKZ  index KKZ institution index is an aggregate indicator
of the quality of institutional development in
the country. The index is calculated using the
average indicators of information on six issues:
voice accountability, political stability,
government’s effectiveness, regulatory quality,
rule of law, and control of corruption. Higher
value indicates higher institutional quality.
Worldwide Governance
Indicator. Kaufman et al.
(2010).
Macroeconomics
Log (GDP per capita) Natural logarithm of real GDP per capita. World Bank: World
Development Indicators.
Bank  credit growth Bank credit growth is the growth of domestic
credit provided by ban king sector to GDP.
Domestic credit provided by the banking
sector includes all credit to various sectors on a
gross basis, with the exception of credit to the
central government, which is net. The banking
sector includes monetary authorities and
deposit money banks, as well as other ban king
institution.
World Bank: World
Development Indicators.
GDP  growth The real annual growth of GDP. World Bank: World
Development Indicators.
Inﬂation The annual change in the consumer price
index.
World Bank: World
Development Indicators.
Bank-level variables
Log (size) Natural logarithm of a bank total assets. BankScope.
Capital adequacy The ratio of equity to total assets of a bank. BankScope.
Share of wholesale funding The ratio of money market funding to total
deposits of a bank.
BankScope.
Efﬁciency Inverse of a bank’s overhead costs to total
assets.
BankScope.
Diversiﬁcation The ratio of non-interest income to total
income of a bank.
BankScope.
Stability A measure of a bank soundness calculated as
return on assets plus capital ratio divided by
volatility of return on assets.
BankScope.
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Table A.4
Average of country-level bank market structure, regulation and institutions over 1999–2011.
Row Code Market structure Market contestability Inter-industry Institution
Concent. Foreign
bank
own.
State
bank
own.
Activity
rest.
Financial
conglom.
Limit on
foreign
banks
Entry req. Fraction
denied
Insurance
penetra-
tion
Stock
market
capital.
Stock
market
efﬁciency
Financial
freedom
Property
right
KKZ
index
1 ALB 86.34 42.30 57.70 7.00 7.00 8.00 0.00 0.53 54.62 30.77 −0.37
2  DZA 94.30 6.97 92.89 5.50 9.00 4.00 7.50 0.00 0.59 35.38 33.08 −0.84
3  AGO 90.04 46.28 28.91 6.00 4.00 8.00 0.00 1.03 38.75 23.75 −1.20
4  ATG 100.00 58.40 0.00 7.00 6.67 4.00 8.00 6.65 0.75
5  ARG 55.48 34.73 35.29 7.31 5.62 3.80 6.77 0.15 2.41 37.27 9.67 44.62 36.92 −0.28
6  ARM 83.27 51.34 0.77 8.62 5.85 3.20 7.69 0.23 1.00 4.81 71.54 43.08 −0.31
7  AUS 88.48 16.19 0.00 7.54 7.08 4.00 7.69 0.00 6.69 113.69 80.31 90.00 90.00 1.60
8  AUT 75.17 12.85 2.20 4.62 5.00 4.00 7.92 0.07 4.94 26.18 43.32 70.00 90.00 1.62
9  AZE 66.97 10.45 31.35 9.00 6.00 7.00 0.25 0.45 32.31 28.08 −0.86
10  BHR 95.00 61.68 1.57 7.85 5.77 4.00 8.00 0.22 1.99 105.24 4.70 80.77 62.31 0.20
11  BGD 58.90 7.72 55.65 9.11 11.00 4.00 6.08 0.83 0.73 7.09 81.65 24.62 27.69 −0.93
12  BLR 94.87 15.95 72.13 9.08 6.15 3.00 7.31 0.40 0.66 22.31 26.15 −0.94
13  BEL 92.71 28.70 0.00 6.23 5.31 4.00 7.92 0.00 8.16 65.70 41.43 72.31 86.15 1.33
14  BLZ 100.00 73.89 0.00 10.44 6.50 4.00 8.00 0.53 3.62 50.00 50.00 −0.02
15  BEN 98.83 91.00 0.00 7.44 7.22 3.44 8.00 0.73 52.31 33.08 −0.23
16  BTN 17.11 64.39 9.46 9.08 4.00 7.62 0.85 30.00 60.00 0.11
17  BOL 90.59 37.20 2.23 8.67 8.00 4.00 8.00 0.00 1.20 17.81 0.93 64.62 30.38 −0.52
18  BIH 69.97 67.47 13.96 6.69 6.69 4.00 7.92 0.00 1.70 50.77 10.77 −0.40
19  BWA  97.65 95.78 4.22 8.38 6.15 3.00 7.92 0.37 2.42 27.48 3.38 70.00 70.38 0.70
20  BRA 61.10 21.82 42.95 6.77 4.85 4.00 8.00 0.24 1.89 51.78 49.26 48.46 50.00 0.03
21  BGR 76.65 74.17 11.17 7.15 5.92 4.00 8.00 0.16 1.98 15.44 15.97 58.46 37.69 0.20
22  BFA 89.39 56.00 0.00 7.44 7.22 3.44 8.00 0.59 46.92 33.08 −0.32
23  BDI 100.00 4.34 36.46 8.85 8.69 4.00 7.38 0.24 0.88 30.00 28.13 −1.25
24  KHM 84.04 35.50 8.00 9.00 4.50 8.00 0.67 0.10 56.15 30.00 −0.83
25  CMR 88.78 0.00 0.00 7.50 5.50 4.00 8.00 0.83 46.15 30.00 −0.88
26  CAN 83.82 6.00 0.00 5.08 8.38 4.00 8.00 0.06 5.52 114.75 73.74 73.08 90.00 1.62
27  CYM 85.00 98.21 0.00 6.11 4.33 4.00 7.11 0.00 0.18 45.38 26.15 1.16
28  CHL 68.14 46.91 14.42 9.08 7.85 3.20 4.00 0.06 3.47 103.79 14.85 65.38 89.23 1.17
29  CHN 70.69 1.89 68.76 10.89 8.00 4.00 7.00 2.44 62.77 131.23 33.08 26.15 −0.54
30  COL 77.67 19.80 15.60 9.78 9.56 2.80 8.00 0.00 1.90 32.60 10.04 66.15 39.23 −0.48
31  CRI 73.81 23.99 57.87 10.22 6.00 2.56 6.67 0.00 1.86 9.97 5.29 48.46 50.38 0.57
32  CIV 89.09 84.20 10.60 7.44 7.22 3.44 8.00 1.22 20.45 2.38 60.77 30.00 −1.24
33  HRV 74.13 64.46 14.28 6.00 5.46 4.00 6.85 0.63 2.48 34.82 5.62 58.46 31.54 0.34
34  CYP 96.81 21.36 3.32 7.00 8.11 4.00 5.85 0.04 4.43 49.97 38.88 70.00 85.38 1.03
35  CZE 79.90 66.80 8.43 7.67 6.67 4.00 8.00 0.00 3.57 23.74 56.93 86.15 69.23 0.84
36  DNK 89.65 11.62 0.05 6.38 6.69 4.00 8.00 0.04 8.21 62.67 79.52 85.38 90.38 1.86
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37 DOM 82.03 8.45 26.29 10.80 4.00 4.00 8.00 0.00 1.37 43.08 30.00 −0.35
38  ECU 71.97 6.03 14.51 9.60 8.00 4.00 8.00 0.50 1.59 7.56 4.39 45.38 31.15 −0.77
39  EGY 69.83 13.07 66.00 8.00 7.00 4.00 7.38 0.78 0.71 49.45 35.68 38.46 46.15 −0.52
40  SLV 89.06 28.17 5.12 9.54 10.11 4.00 7.69 0.16 1.72 19.58 3.15 70.00 52.31 −0.16
41  EST 99.88 94.75 0.00 5.08 5.85 4.00 8.00 0.00 1.90 26.18 20.85 82.31 76.15 0.99
42  ETH 96.73 0.00 70.98 10.00 9.20 0.00 5.60 0.00 0.61 26.15 30.00 −0.97
43  FIN 99.07 27.60 6.74 5.92 4.62 4.00 5.23 0.05 3.82 119.20 110.42 69.23 90.38 1.89
44  FRA 73.09 14.86 0.56 5.23 5.00 4.00 6.46 0.00 8.84 82.59 94.96 56.92 71.54 1.23
45  GAB 0.00 0.00 7.50 5.50 4.00 8.00 1.06 46.15 46.15 −0.48
46  GMB  99.44 85.38 0.00 10.78 8.31 4.00 7.56 0.00 47.69 40.38 −0.42
47  GEO 94.20 29.10 0.00 6.00 9.00 7.00 0.27 0.39 5.63 6.03 50.00 33.85 −0.39
48  DEU 85.96 5.53 40.64 4.33 5.33 4.00 5.33 0.00 5.36 48.04 130.43 53.08 90.00 1.47
49  GHA 74.00 52.03 22.59 8.92 5.31 2.80 8.00 0.47 0.95 13.36 3.01 50.77 50.00 0.00
50  GRC 87.19 9.34 17.11 6.92 5.22 4.00 7.31 0.06 1.66 59.48 56.18 47.69 55.38 0.64
51  GRD 88.70 0.00 7.00 6.67 4.00 8.00 8.20 0.45
52  GTM 66.05 8.16 4.48 9.00 7.08 4.00 7.38 0.27 0.98 61.54 35.38 −0.60
53  GIN 90.00 0.00 3.00 9.00 8.00 0.33 0.06 53.08 27.69 −1.22
54  GUY 32.92 10.46 10.15 6.92 4.00 7.69 0.20 4.55 52.31 45.00 −0.36
55  HND 68.90 20.18 0.60 7.33 8.50 4.00 8.00 0.00 1.63 57.69 36.15 −0.57
56  HKG 82.77 0.00 3.44 7.00 4.00 6.11 0.00 8.49 407.70 80.77 90.00 90.00 1.38
57  HUN 85.47 82.33 3.84 7.46 6.54 4.00 7.69 0.15 3.04 24.50 79.77 69.23 69.23 0.87
58  ISL 0.00 22.81 7.46 5.38 4.00 7.69 0.00 2.62 85.07 57.69 62.31 90.00 1.70
59  IND 42.53 4.89 76.21 8.69 8.46 4.00 6.15 0.57 2.87 61.89 131.80 32.31 50.00 −0.26
60  IDN 64.20 24.55 40.93 10.56 8.40 4.00 7.56 0.08 1.29 31.42 49.73 33.85 33.08 −0.65
61  IRL 90.36 62.90 20.69 5.23 5.69 4.00 5.23 0.00 8.93 53.83 45.95 84.62 90.00 1.52
62  ISR 91.34 1.48 36.88 9.69 8.77 4.00 4.31 0.13 4.52 78.14 56.92 55.38 70.00 0.56
63  ITA 71.21 8.09 11.17 7.92 7.31 4.00 8.00 0.18 6.44 40.38 132.73 64.62 61.15 0.63
64  JAM 97.42 72.43 24.89 9.56 7.33 4.00 8.00 0.67 3.81 72.23 2.81 56.15 51.92 −0.04
65  JPN 52.87 6.23 0.58 8.67 7.33 4.00 6.67 0.00 7.44 77.64 103.70 46.92 76.15 1.14
66  JOR 98.43 47.20 0.00 7.54 6.33 3.80 7.69 0.70 1.76 137.54 36.11 66.15 56.15 −0.01
67  KAZ 75.72 12.35 2.33 7.33 8.00 3.00 7.69 0.00 0.63 22.91 10.92 43.08 30.00 −0.60
68  KEN 68.43 38.78 1.02 8.54 8.08 4.00 7.69 0.68 2.25 28.63 7.49 53.08 43.46 −0.71
69  KOR 73.82 32.11 28.94 7.46 7.78 4.00 7.67 0.00 10.51 72.94 243.38 54.62 76.15 0.69
70  KWT  92.26 0.00 0.00 6.46 6.62 3.60 6.46 0.41 0.58 97.98 61.76 50.00 62.69 0.23
71  KGZ 100.00 32.55 12.39 5.67 8.00 3.56 8.00 0.04 0.14 1.56 188.61 50.00 28.85 −0.86
72  LVA 68.61 60.07 5.06 5.62 4.69 4.00 8.00 0.08 1.61 8.60 11.51 66.15 51.15 0.60
73  LBN 63.08 34.49 1.00 8.54 5.54 3.20 8.00 0.00 1.86 21.84 11.17 67.69 34.23 −0.56
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Table A.4 (Continued)
Row Code Market structure Market contestability Inter-industry Institution
Concent. Foreign
bank
own.
State
bank
own.
Activity
rest.
Financial
conglom.
Limit on
foreign
banks
Entry req. Fraction
denied
Insurance
penetra-
tion
Stock
market
capital.
Stock
market
efﬁciency
Financial
freedom
Property
right
KKZ
index
74 LSO 84.07 23.39 9.33 10.50 4.00 8.00 0.50 4.81 44.62 46.15 −0.19
75  LTU 90.11 84.45 17.28 7.23 6.77 4.00 8.00 0.22 1.36 17.56 11.96 72.31 51.15 0.66
76  LUX 43.57 94.66 5.07 4.85 7.67 4.00 8.00 0.00 5.42 163.53 1.05 83.08 90.00 1.71
77  MAC  95.36 54.09 0.69 7.00 6.77 4.00 7.38 0.53 1.94 70.00 60.00 0.75
78  MKD  86.54 65.03 1.14 7.33 6.67 3.00 8.00 0.50 1.75 8.71 174.76 65.00 31.00 −0.29
79  MDG  100.00 74.24 0.00 8.20 6.80 3.00 7.56 0.14 0.60 46.92 48.85 −0.34
80  MWI  99.86 19.77 24.06 10.22 6.56 3.00 7.89 0.26 1.57 19.45 3.21 45.38 47.69 −0.37
81  MYS  77.97 19.63 0.00 7.67 9.00 3.00 7.38 0.00 4.55 139.69 33.08 38.46 53.46 0.36
82  MLI  95.43 67.00 21.80 7.44 7.22 3.44 8.00 0.47 41.54 39.62 −0.29
83  MLT  99.62 59.95 0.00 7.69 6.69 4.00 8.00 0.00 4.55 46.32 4.97 64.62 84.62 1.19
84  MUS  83.37 41.10 0.82 9.69 8.00 4.00 7.69 0.00 4.51 45.73 6.32 66.92 66.15 0.74
85  MEX  74.40 62.72 12.56 7.08 6.00 3.00 8.00 1.57 28.64 28.16 58.46 50.00 −0.08
86  MDA  74.81 30.78 7.32 8.38 6.08 4.00 8.00 0.27 1.02 3.25 80.20 50.00 47.69 −0.47
87  MNE  93.16 88.40 5.00 6.00 4.00 8.00 0.00 69.74 9.22 42.00 36.00 −0.09
88  MAR  85.34 20.36 29.30 8.62 5.85 4.00 8.00 0.15 2.35 52.33 19.52 46.92 36.92 −0.30
89  MOZ  97.17 93.95 0.00 7.60 8.60 4.00 8.00 0.00 0.85 53.08 30.00 −0.32
90  MMR  100.00 69.00 8.00 10.00 8.00 0.06 −1.68
91  NAM 98.56 73.27 0.00 6.89 7.60 4.00 8.00 0.75 7.57 8.27 2.77 53.85 48.46 0.28
92  NPL 62.34 31.50 20.86 7.40 3.00 8.00 0.92 21.17 5.14 30.00 33.46 −0.86
93  NLD 90.18 5.55 5.48 4.69 4.69 4.00 8.00 0.00 6.41 101.52 133.62 87.69 90.00 1.70
94  NZL 97.10 98.38 0.69 3.46 3.31 4.00 6.69 0.05 2.92 39.93 43.50 86.15 91.15 1.75
95  NIC 94.14 12.52 0.11 10.50 10.89 3.60 8.00 0.05 1.39 58.46 28.08 −0.53
96  NER 100.00 73.40 0.00 7.44 7.22 3.44 8.00 0.51 40.77 31.54 −0.62
97  NGA 60.39 1.47 6.67 7.44 6.38 3.00 8.00 0.00 0.61 18.70 13.20 34.62 31.54 −1.14
98  NOR 97.73 22.03 0.00 6.33 8.22 4.00 7.89 0.00 4.83 52.35 109.85 52.31 90.00 1.68
99  OMN  98.09 7.67 0.00 8.92 9.08 3.40 8.00 0.64 1.05 30.70 23.57 50.00 51.54 0.32
100  PAK 65.53 36.71 35.04 9.33 7.89 4.00 7.38 0.00 0.63 22.25 253.74 42.31 30.00 −1.01
101  PAN 63.92 50.75 11.82 8.00 5.31 4.00 8.00 0.03 2.63 29.32 2.09 76.92 36.15 0.09
102  PRY 68.51 74.85 8.53 8.80 9.00 4.00 7.56 0.00 1.00 3.52 1.84 56.92 30.38 −0.81
103  PER 87.19 42.58 4.59 6.92 5.69 4.00 7.69 0.16 1.09 43.24 8.17 66.15 40.00 −0.33
104  PHI 69.77 13.53 1.185 5.00 8.00 3.40 7.69 0.34 1.28 49.16 21.59 48.46 40.77 −0.47
105  POL 71.32 55.54 28.62 7.31 4.54 4.00 7.31 0.00 2.95 26.80 40.50 60.77 58.85 0.63
106  PRT 93.06 15.67 22.85 7.15 6.38 4.00 7.31 0.00 6.71 40.32 64.11 52.31 70.00 1.09
107  QAT 98.11 11.92 44.70 5.78 8.00 6.67 0.00 1.14 100.43 24.06 43.85 52.69 0.49
108  ROM 82.26 33.92 50.57 8.62 6.23 4.00 8.00 0.31 1.30 13.75 15.34 47.69 31.92 0.05
109  RUS 42.27 9.42 46.83 5.92 5.38 3.00 8.00 1.53 54.67 58.41 36.92 33.46 −0.73
110  RWA  93.02 25.00 28.30 8.00 6.00 8.00 0.33 0.60 33.85 25.77 −0.66
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111 KNA 55.55 35.65 7.00 6.67 4.00 8.00 0.74
112 WSM  83.76 0.00 10.00 6.60 4.00 8.00 1.00 40.00 54.17 0.45
113  SAU 77.54 10.35 13.73 8.33 6.00 4.00 8.00 0.36 80.94 120.05 40.77 49.62 −0.35
114  SEN 85.33 78.70 0.00 7.44 7.22 3.44 8.00 1.10 46.15 48.85 −0.22
115 SRB 65.80 73.50 17.90 7.00 8.00 3.00 8.00 0.00 1.89 24.41 14.73 42.00 36.00 −0.41
116 SLE 94.08 62.29 37.71 6.00 8.00 4.00 8.00 0.29 0.38 29.09 13.64 −0.88
117  SGP 97.77 52.33 0.00 6.38 7.00 4.00 8.00 6.78 183.23 68.38 61.54 90.00 1.47
118 SVK 89.20 80.18 9.67 7.46 6.77 4.00 8.00 0.60 3.10 5.85 23.47 71.54 50.38 0.72
119  SVN 77.38 15.91 25.47 7.23 6.62 4.00 7.69 0.00 3.65 23.85 14.53 51.54 56.92 0.95
120  ZAF 98.60 19.63 0.01 6.92 5.62 3.20 7.31 0.16 14.06 194.46 47.87 56.92 50.00 0.34
121 ESP 84.78 9.75 0.00 5.31 5.08 4.00 8.00 0.03 5.06 84.12 166.26 73.85 70.00 1.02
122 LKA 88.46 6.91 36.55 7.23 8.00 4.00 8.00 0.57 1.31 18.79 18.64 44.62 49.23 −0.33
123 SDN 92.25 4.00 12.00 8.00 6.00 8.00 0.75 0.41 30.00 30.00 −1.52
124  SUR 24.33 23.60 7.22 9.33 3.56 8.00 0.00 1.97 30.00 47.69 −0.08
125 SWZ  85.51 14.50 10.20 9.60 4.00 7.56 46.92 53.46 −0.62
126 SWE  97.70 0.90 0.00 7.00 5.33 4.00 8.00 0.03 6.72 108.07 115.27 79.23 87.31 1.76
127 CHE 91.80 9.47 13.76 4.54 4.38 4.00 8.00 0.03 8.90 230.51 95.76 83.85 90.00 1.74
128 SYR 93.56 0.00 71.00 8.20 9.00 1.20 8.00 0.00 0.48 13.85 29.62 −0.90
129  TJK 100.00 19.23 7.75 7.67 7.40 4.00 7.69 0.18 0.52 29.23 29.23 −1.14
130  TZA 75.99 52.21 17.74 6.60 8.40 2.80 7.80 0.10 0.64 4.69 4.55 54.62 33.08 −0.41
131  THA 66.28 6.13 24.67 8.31 9.00 1.67 8.00 0.18 3.33 59.22 89.79 53.85 56.92 −0.10
132  TGO 17.50 51.00 7.44 7.22 3.44 8.00 1.14 26.92 30.00 −0.94
133  TTO 96.35 14.35 15.90 7.85 5.85 3.11 5.85 0.56 4.42 73.71 2.77 70.00 68.85 0.18
134  TUN 64.11 15.70 42.70 8.00 7.00 4.00 8.00 0.00 1.47 13.67 14.75 39.23 50.00 −0.07
135  TUR 81.10 6.32 33.21 7.67 5.56 4.00 7.11 0.48 1.00 29.75 153.72 51.54 54.62 −0.10
136  UGA 78.12 75.58 0.64 10.40 8.00 3.00 8.00 0.17 0.50 10.70 1.48 56.92 40.77 −0.63
137  UKR 95.05 17.96 12.98 5.00 8.00 4.00 8.00 2.32 20.51 7.43 40.00 30.00 −0.57
138  ARE 74.55 27.00 35.00 5.80 6.00 3.00 8.00 0.00 1.47 26.57 62.43 43.85 61.54 0.50
139  GBR 63.11 46.53 2.89 3.69 3.77 4.00 8.00 14.64 136.40 126.50 88.46 89.23 1.45
140  USA 38.01 10.73 0.00 8.38 7.78 4.00 7.69 0.01 7.34 81.54 89.23 1.29
141  URY 70.75 41.77 51.01 7.22 8.00 4.00 7.11 0.00 1.73 0.54 3.08 48.46 70.38 0.72
142  VUT 92.56 8.58 9.11 7.44 4.00 7.69 0.00 40.00 40.00 0.15
143  VEN 62.58 35.05 9.19 7.00 7.77 4.00 7.69 0.17 1.57 4.29 5.57 37.69 25.38 −1.08
144  VNM 74.90 12.00 8.00 8.00 1.25 12.29 58.03 30.00 10.77 −0.53
145  YEM 100.00 9.00 10.00 4.00 8.00 0.80 0.23 30.00 30.00 −1.10
146  ZMB  82.80 64.00 23.00 9.00 10.00 8.00 1.27 13.36 4.40 53.08 43.85 −0.43
Mean  82.64 38.38 17.24 7.58 7.03 3.71 7.58 0.20 2.81 53.51 48.96 53.50 50.33 0.08
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